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ARTICLES

Khrushchev's Disarmament Proposal

Nikolai Galay

The Soviet government's declaration on the question of disarmament, submitted by Khrushchev to the United Nations, appears to be the only diplomatic document resulting from the latter's recent visit to the United States. A few days before its publication, Western newspaper correspondents had learned from their meeting with Khrushchev of his intention of making some important proposals on disarmament. Speaking before the United Nations, Khrushchev acknowledged that all the negotiations that had taken place on this question during the last fourteen years had been fruitless, chiefly because of the problem of controlling disarmament, and declared the necessity of adopting an entirely new approach.[1] The new features of Khrushchev's approach are, first, the radical nature of his proposals for disarmament, and, second, the suggestion that disarmament be carried out practically without control and that effective international control be allowed only after disarmament has been completed.

In respect to the first of these two points, Khrushchev proposes that all armaments be destroyed throughout the world. Within four years, all land forces are to be demobilized, all naval and air force equipment scrapped, all military headquarters and war ministries abolished, all military bases, training establishments and military schools closed, and all atomic, hydrogen and rocket weapons destroyed and their further manufacture discontinued, the only exception to the last point being the retention and development of rockets for interplanetary projects.

With regard to the control of disarmament, which Khrushchev agrees to in principle, the Soviet proposals are rather less radical and formulated in general, not to say obscure, terms. The only definite feature here is the proposal that

[1] *Izvestia*, September 19, 1959.

international inspection be initiated only after universal disarmament has been completed. The stipulation that inspection be based on the principle of "fair geographical distribution" of the organs of control may be interpreted in various ways: for example, it may mean that each country is to carry out its own inspection, merely reporting to some international inspection authority; or that the number of inspection points is to be the same in every country; or that if inspection commissions are of international composition, certain members of the commissions in each country have the right to exercise a "veto," etc.

Khrushchev's proposals concerning the police forces within each state are also indefinite. According to these, after all armed forces have been abolished "only limited contingents of police equipped with light arms will remain to preserve internal order and ensure the protection of persons."[2] What is meant by "light weapons" is indeed doubtful. The military operation carried out by a dozen or so divisions of the Southern Group of the Soviet Army in suppressing the Hungarian rising in 1956, for example, has always been described by Soviet propaganda as the "restoration of internal order in Hungary." In 1955, the police forces of the USSR, i.e., the troops of the MVD and the Committee of State Security, together with the frontier forces, but excluding several hundred thousand militiamen, numbered as many as 800,000. The cuts in the Soviet armed forces carried out in 1955–59 resulted in a reduction of their numbers to approximately 600,000–650,000. Obviously, the equipping of a police force of these dimensions would require the retention of at least part of the country's war industry. It is worth pointing out that a police force of 600,000–650,000 men, including about 300,000 members of the frontier police, is larger than the entire armed forces of Great Britain at the present time and more than four times as large as the entire police force of the United States, which comprises something over 150,000 men, including civilian personnel.[3]

The Soviet declaration entirely overlooks these matters. On the other hand, it devotes much space to a description of the advantages accruing from a cessation of the arms race and the abolition of all military installations and equipment. Khrushchev suggests the *partial* use of the funds that would thus be made available for assisting the underdeveloped countries. In addition, he attempted to dissipate the fears of Western industrialists and governments concerning the possibility of an economic crisis after the liquidation of war industries by hinting at the possibility of large orders from the countries of the "socialist camp." Finally, without waiting for the West's reply, he declared the willingness of his government to negotiate on limited disarmament, repeating proposals which were already familiar from negotiations in the United Nations Disarmament Commission: the establishment of a control and inspection zone and the reduction of foreign troops on the territory of the countries concerned in *Western* Europe; the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe (i.e., in Western Germany);

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *The World Almanac and Book of Facts*, New York, 1954, p. 308.

the removal of all foreign troops from the territory of European countries and the abolition of military bases on foreign soil; the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; and the working out of an agreement for the prevention of a surprise attack–in a word, all the Soviet proposals which had been endlessly and fruitlessly discussed at meetings of the UN Disarmament Commission.

What do Khrushchev's proposals on disarmament amount to? First of all, it may be said that the suggestion of complete disarmament is not new. This was pointed out by *The New York Times* in an article entitled "The League and Litvinov's Plan,"[4] which recalled the similar project submitted by Litvinov to the League of Nations on November 30, 1927, and expressed the view that Khrushchev's project was an adaptation of Litvinov's to present-day circumstances. In fact, however, both men derived their projects from a common source–Lenin's instructions on the theory and practice of disarmament which were obligatory for every "socialist state." The *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* writes on this point as follows:

> Disarmament (that is: if it be full and complete) can only be effected as a result of the victory of the socialist revolution throughout the world. "The idea of disarmament is a Utopia in a society founded on class contrasts" (Lenin, see *Leninsky sbornik*, XIX, 1932, p. 79). The slogan of disarmament was exploited by the bourgeois pacifists and taken up by the Second International to deceive the toiling masses, who were thirsting for peace.[5]

Lenin's theory, that disarmament is impossible before the realization of world-wide socialist revolution, reduces disarmament policy to an attack on the "bourgeois pacifists," and thus pursues a negative, not a positive aim.

> In order to unmask the bourgeois pacifists, the Soviet state, at the very first international conference in which it took part (the Genoa Conference of 1922), submitted a proposal for including in the agenda the question of general disarmament . . .
>
> The proposals of the socialist state on disarmament did not contradict the principle of Marxism-Leninism that disarmament is impossible under the conditions of capitalism. On the contrary, they acted as propaganda for this principle vis-à-vis the world's toiling masses.[6]

Throughout the forty years of the USSR's existence the Soviet leaders have steadily continued this type of propaganda, advancing proposals for complete or partial disarmament, usually without adequate provisions for control. These included the proposals made at the conference of 1922 attended by the USSR, Poland and other states bordering on the Western USSR; at the conference of experts summoned in 1924 by the League of Nations in Rome; the League of Nations proposal made in 1925; Litvinov's project of 1927; the project for pro-

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[4] *The New York Times*, September 20, 1959.

[5] *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, 1st ed., 1941, XLVIII, 158–59.

[6] *Ibid.*

gressive disarmament of 1929; and the two proposals, one for complete, the other for limited, proportional, disarmament, made by the Soviet representatives at the international disarmament conference of 1932–35. After the conclusion of World War II and the formation of the United Nations, Soviet efforts became concentrated on the banning of atomic weapons. In rejecting in 1946, under the pretext that interference in the internal affairs of states was inadmissible, the Baruch plan for control of all forms of atomic energy, entailing international inspections, aerial photographs, and armed protection for inspection teams, the Soviet government adopted as its primary aim in disarmament policy the banning of atomic weapons without permitting any effective system of inspection.

That Soviet opposition to effective disarmament control is solely due to a desire to ensure the security of the USSR within its "capitalist encirclement" and to create a situation in which it can retain its military advantage over the West is an incomplete view. An even more powerful motive for the Soviet refusal to cooperate in this matter is the desire for internal security. Dr. Pietro Quaroni, at present Italian Ambassador to Bonn, pointed this out with particular clarity in a paper delivered before the Free University of Berlin in 1958:

> In my opinion, people in the West do not realize sufficiently clearly that the internal security of the Soviet regime rests upon the belief of the Soviet masses that there is no power in the world which can stand up against the Soviet government. If some group of people with uniform caps on their heads were to appear everywhere in the Soviet Union and require sealed doors to be opened, simple people in Russia might think that there was something in the world that was stronger than their government. This might prove the beginning of the end for its authority.[7]

Dr. Quaroni goes on: "Hence, we are faced with the alternative: either disarmament without control (or rather, with the very limited control accepted by the Soviets), or no disarmament."[8] However, he proceeds to draw attention to the changes brought about by the contemporary revolution in military technique–the use of nuclear weapons–as a result of which he considers some limitation of armaments to be possible. Both sides, he says, might come to the conclusion that there is no sense in further accumulating powerful nuclear weapons, which are already available in large quantities, and that other weapons are of no great consequence in comparison with the nuclear. Such a situation, however, has not yet come about. The Soviet government still attaches great importance to ordinary weapons, which it regards as supplementing atomic weapons and as enabling the conduct of limited wars. While striving for a world ban on nuclear weapons, which are the chief resource of the free world, Soviet policy regards the abolition of conventional weapons with great reserve.

> Only after it has disarmed the bourgeoisie can the proletariat, without betraying its task in world history, scrap all its weapons. This the proletariat will do, *but only then, and in no case before.*[9]

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[7] Pietro Quaroni, *Ost und West und die Gipfelkonferenz*, Berlin, 1958, p. 22.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] V. I. Lenin, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, 4th ed., 1946, vol. I, p. 845.

In the same place, Lenin declares: "Socialists cannot be against war without ceasing to be socialist."[10] This view which underlies Soviet policy's approach to the problem of disarmament is quite well known to the responsible leaders of the free world, not only as a theory, but as a practice having dangerous consequences. In turn the demand to hold firmly to the weapons of the Communist revolution comes into conflict with the determination of the free world to defend its liberty by all the means at its disposal, even atomic weapons. But the development of nuclear weapons as part of the great arms race lays a heavy burden not only on the free countries, but also, and to a greater degree, upon the Communist camp, for not only is the national income of these latter countries approximately one third that of the free countries, but the parallel development of nuclear and other weapons on a scale sufficient to supply the largest army on the continent of Europe demands enormous resources. The Soviet government is no longer in a position to impose the economic burdens on the masses of the population that Stalin could and did impose. It may therefore be said that the Soviet proposals for disarmament, including that recently made by Khrushchev, are not merely intended to "unmask the bourgeois pacifists," but also to provide a compromise between Lenin's demands for military preparedness and the necessity of slackening the arms race, which swallows up 25–30 percent of the entire income from "socialist production." The need for a respite in the arms race cannot be concealed, either by Soviet successes in developing rocket weapons, or by Khrushchev's assertion that "speculations on the weakness of the Soviet Union are absurd."[11]

The Soviet government's desire to relieve the burden of the arms race, though a definite one, is yet not sufficiently strong to enable it to ignore the question of internal security pointed out by Dr. Quaroni. On the other hand, disarmament without the simultaneous establishment of effective controls would be highly dangerous for the free world. The late Secretary of State of the United States, Dulles, indicated this danger some time ago in a speech wherein he gave specific examples.[12] This explains the special significance for the free world of the problem of effective controls on disarmament in order not to upset the balance of power in favor of the Communist bloc, which can, under a totalitarian system, much more easily conceal the status of their armed forces and military equipment. The problem of control is burdened with difficulties of two types: those of a general nature, i.e., how to control effectively the military potential of any large country with the complex interdependence of military and civilian industries; and the specific difficulties as to what to do to control the armament of totalitarian countries, such as the USSR, China and the Soviet satellites.

The general difficulties, which have thwarted control in the past, are best illustrated by referring to the experience of the Allied Control Commission that was responsible for the disarmament of Germany after World War I. At that time

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 842.

[11] *Izvestia*, September 19, 1959.

[12] *The New York Times*, November 11, 1955.

the complete prohibition of a German airforce or armored force did not succeed in preventing German industry from being prepared to outfit these forces, which had been forbidden by the peace treaty, within the short period of three years. In 1938, the German armed forces were already not only equal, but quite superior to those of its opponents in both quality and quantity. The abolition of the German General Staff did not prevent the German military from retaining its lead in military theory. Moreover it not only did not stop the Germans from developing new types of tanks and planes, but they trained new cadres of military specialists as well. The enforced curtailment of the German Army and its transformation into a small professional army for a period of 12 years, which was to prevent the building up of a military reserve, did not manage to stave off the creation of these reserves by the training of them outside the military proper in sports clubs and party organizations. The covert organization of war industry, the secret storehouses of equipment and the schools for training German air and armored personnel in the USSR (now the USSR could have such schools in China or North Viet Nam) are only a few examples of the circumvention the Control Commission, which carried out inspections in the whole of Germany with a great deal of personnel for whom every door was open, and which until 1933 operated without the hindrance of any "veto right." It is significant that all these evasions of the peace treaty could be effected under the democratic regime of the Weimar Republic. (Only, in the field of naval construction, which lends itself more readily to control, were German armaments under effective observation and hence limited.)

A more recent example of the lack of effectiveness of such controls on armaments is the situation which has existed in Korea since the conclusion of the armistice in 1953. According to the neutral Swiss observers, who took part in the Supervisory Commission, the prohibition of the increase from abroad of military forces over and above what they were at the time of the armistice was frequently violated on the Communist side. Even with the presence of controls North Korea reequipped its army with material coming from Russia through Manchuria, enlarged its airforce, and increased the number of its military airfields, etc. Similar occurrences have been brought to light by the work of the control commission in Indo-China after the truce of 1954. The fact that in Lebanon in 1958, the UNO control posts reported that they were not able to establish whether the rebels, carrying on the civil war, were infiltrators from Syria or local insurgents, a question which was decided in favor of the former only after the restoration of order, throws light on the difficulties of control even as regards small countries with limited areas. The same difficulties face the UNO commission which has been sent to Laos to investigate the Communist infiltration of the border areas of that country from North Viet Nam.

The specific difficulties of controlling a country with a totalitarian regime, a country with an area of 22 million square kilometers like the USSR, not to speak of China, are multiplied moreover by the lack of a free press, the poor methods of reportage, the strict control of the government over its citizens and the falsi-

fication of all statistics, even the budget, by government organs. At one time Soviet commentators openly recognized these problems:

> . . . on the territory of so large a country as the USSR one can hide anything that he wants to without aerial observation being able to find the secret.[13]

This statement was at the time directed against President Eisenhower's proposals for unlimited air inspection (1955) and was supported on the part of the Soviets by statements concerning the futility of hopes for control over the production of atomic materials for military purposes.

> Hopes of control over atomic production are futile at this time . . . the production of fissionable material is impossible to expose with one-hundred percent accuracy. One can always conceal the production of a number of [materials] and with time this number would increase.[14]

The ease with which fissionable material is converted from peaceful to military purposes is the chief difficulty which necessitates a thorough control of all the producing centers of atomic industry. The Soviet Union has up to the present time categorically rejected such control. Its opposition to effective controls has been clearly shown in the year long Geneva talks on the prohibition of atomic tests, the attainment of which is an important goal of Soviet policy.

The reasons for the Soviet leaders insistence on prohibition of atomic tests, for the continuation of which the USSR is in a less favorable position than the USA because Soviet territory is more susceptible to the danger of radioactive fallout, have already been pointed out in this publication in an earlier article.[15] In spite of the present wish on the Soviets' part to curtail atomic testing, the Soviet representatives in Geneva, in talks conducted on specific problems have clearly demonstrated their opposition to the establishment of effective controls by a great many demands for the limitation of these controls. They have demanded that two-thirds of the personnel of the control posts be composed of representatives of the country where the posts are located, that an annual limit be placed on the number of investigations which could be made by the control authorities, and that decisions in the central control authority be unanimous, that is that the "veto right" be established.

However, the common interests of both the USSR and the United States in limiting atomic armaments: the general inclination of both countries not to extend the membership of the "atomic club" (there is no advantage for the USSR or the USA in the conversion of China or France into an atomic power) and the striving of both for a reduction of the armaments burden, especially in consideration of the present atomic "stalemate," which has given rise to disbelief in the outbreak of a world war in the near future, have all created the preconditions for talks on disarmament. In the present and forthcoming negotiations for disarmament, the Soviet leaders, making use of the universal desire for peace, will strive to achieve the following intermediary aims:

[13] *Novoe vremya*, September 15, 1955.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Bulletin*, No. 4 (1958), pp. 39—43.

1. To secure, by means of agreements, condemnation of the use in any circumstances of atomic weapons, in order to deprive the USA and the rest of the free world of its cardinal source of military power;

2. To secure an agreement on partial disarmament in order to exploit any ambiguities to its own advantage and ensure the possibility of resuming armament at any moment from a tactically advantageous position;

3. To prevent effective control of disarmament by reducing it to a fictional control.

Whether the Soviet government will succeed in these aims depends on the willingness of the free world to accept Soviet proposals for a temporary cessation of the arms race at the price of an ineffective pseudo-control. As to the question of whether international tension will relax even when negotiations for disarmament prove successful, the answer may confidently be given in the negative. It must be borne in mind that it is not armaments that lead to war, but the situation in which one side believes itself to be stronger than the other. The balance of power is essential if war is to be prevented, but such a state of equilibrium, even when based on an honest agreement on disarmament, cannot remove international friction, particularly when we are dealing with an essentially aggressive Communism. Furthermore, even in the unlikely event of complete disarmament, the Communist camp still has other resources, which are indirectly of warlike character. The weapon of social strife, psychological warfare, economic competition, geopolitical factors, scientific rivalry–all these means can acquire military significance, even during peaceful coexistence, in the hands of totalitarian Communism. Additional disarmament in these fields requires conditions other than those which at present obtain in a world in which there continues to exist a militaristic and totalitarian Communist bloc.

Marxism: Dogma or Guide?

HERMAN ACHMINOV

In the West the view is rather widespread that Marxism or Communism ought to be regarded as a "secular religion." This concept was worked out in detail by the French sociologist Raymond Aron in his book *L'Opium des Intellectuels*, which asserts that he was the first to advance this idea in 1944. The same idea is expressed by Jules Moneroe in his book *The Sociology of Communism* and by many other writers. The concept of Communism as a religion leads to the conclusion that

> doctrine provides genuine Communists with an explanation of the universe, inspires them with feelings similar to those of the crusaders of every age, determines a hierarchy of values, and solves the question of correct behavior. Thus, as regards the spirit of the individual and of the masses, it fulfills several functions which sociologists generally assign to religion.[1]

Elsewhere Aron writes that Communism is only "an attempt to find in ideology a substitute for religion," but is not a genuine religion.[2] However, what is important is not an analysis of the views of any one particular author, but rather the question of principles, whether it is correct to regard Communism as a religion, even if only a "pseudoreligion" at that. The posing of the question in such a way can easily deteriorate into an argument over words, over the definition of the concept "religion." Nonetheless the question must be posed, because the concept of Communism as a pseudoreligion primarily implies that Communists actually have a definite *Weltanschauung*, a "hierarchy of values," which inspires the adherent of this movement with a feeling similar to the feelings of the crusaders of every age. Secondly, this concept is linked with the belief in the existence of the "genuine Communist," "the fanatical believer," who is prepared to fulfill blindly all the requirements of dogma.

The view that Communism is capable of providing a "complete *Weltanschauung*" stems from Lenin's pretentious assertion in his essay *Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism*, which, for various reasons, was accepted on its face value not only by the adherents, but often by the opponents of Marxism too. Lenin wrote:

> Marx' doctrine is all-powerful because it is true. It is rounded off and well proportioned, giving people a complete *Weltanschauung* irreconcilable with superstition . . . . It is the lawful successor of the best that mankind has created in the form of German philosophy, English political economy, and French socialism.[3]

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[1] Raymond Aron, *L'Opium des Intellectuels*, quoted from the German translation, *Opium der Intellektuellen*, Cologne, 1952, p. 319

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 342.

[3] V. I. Lenin, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh* (Selected Works in Two Volumes), Moscow, 1943, vol. II, p. 41.

This statement of Lenin's, made in 1913, was one of the stages in the policy of self-glorification by the Communists, a "line" begun by Engels in his work *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*. It is quite natural that Communists strive to impress upon both their adherents and opponents the view that their doctrine provides a complete *Weltanschauung*. This is an important method of Communist propaganda which serves both to neutralize opponents and to provide a basis for Party activity.

However, an exact definition of what Marx and Lenin considered the core of their teachings will lead to the assertion that in reality it represents considerably less than a religion, or even pseudoreligion. It must be emphasized here that the subject under discussion is Communist ideology, and not Communism as a political phenomenon. The latter's importance must not, of course, be underestimated. The essence of Marx' all-powerful teachings comes down to one point, the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marxism-Leninism can be characterized as the doctrine of the establishment and maintenance of the dictatorship of the Communist Party, or Communist parties, which the Communists themselves call "the dictatorship of the proletariat." This reduction of a so-called "pseudoreligion" or "complete *Weltanschauung*" to a teaching on the struggle of one party for power may seem to both the adherents and opponents of Communism to be a profanation of this historical phenomenon. Nonetheless, there are numerous facts in support of this assumption, which is nothing more than a paraphrase of the last official definition of the concept "Marxism," as given by Stalin in 1950 in his work *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics*, which declared:

> Marxism is a science concerned with the laws of the development of nature and society, a science concerned with a revolution by the oppressed and exploited masses, a science concerned with the victory of socialism in all countries, a science concerned with the building of a Communist society.[4]

The characterization of Marxism as a science concerned with the laws of the development of nature was clearly included for purposes of effect only, since basically Marxism is concerned with political problems. One can even ignore the question as to what justification Stalin had for calling Marxism a science. However, if the word "teaching" is substituted for "science" then the formula advanced above is obtained: Marxism is a teaching on the establishment and maintenance of the dictatorship of the Communist Party.

There are numerous statements by Lenin to the effect that he considered the essence of Marxism to be this very teaching on the so–called dictatorship of the proletariat. In 1917 he wrote in his work *The State and Revolution*:

> Whoever recognizes *only* the class struggle is not yet a Marxist and may prove not yet to have left the framework of bourgeois thought and bourgeois policy. To restrict Marxism to a teaching on the class struggle is to trim Marxism, . . . to bring it down to something acceptable to the bourgeoisie. Only he is a Marxist who extends recognition of the class struggle to a recognition of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*.[5]

[4] *Bolshevik*, No. 14 (1950), p. 6.

[5] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 4th ed., Moscow, 1952, XXI, 392.

It may seem strange to many who are accustomed to regard Marxism as "a complete *Weltanschauung*" or a "pseudoreligion" that Lenin held, for example, recognition of the class struggle to be fully compatible with "bourgeois," that is, in this case democratic or parliamentarian, thought. Yet in this case Lenin was merely repeating a statement made by Marx in a letter to J. Wiedemeier, of March 5, 1852:

> As for me, I do not deserve the credit for the discovery of the existence of classes in contemporary society, nor for the discovery of the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians analyzed the historical development of this class struggle, while bourgeois economists analyzed the economic anatomy of the classes. What I have done that is new consists in proving the following: (1) that the *existence of classes* is only linked with *definite historical phases in the development of production*; (2) that the class struggle inevitably leads to the *dictatorship of the proletariat*; (3) that this dictatorship itself constitutes only the transition to the *destruction of all classes* and to a *classless society* . . .[6]

Thus, Marx held the teaching on dictatorship to be the basis of Marxism in the exact meaning of the word. The question may arise as to how correct it is to regard the teaching on "a party of a new type," which was, of course, worked out by Lenin, as a legitimate addition to Marx' teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, the legitimacy of such a development of Marxism can hardly be refuted. Marx actually demanded the destruction by force of the old state machine and the establishment of a dictatorship on the lines of the Paris Commune. Most important of all he gave an exact definition of a program for Communists: "the abolition of private property," the realization of which is impossible without the establishment of a bloody dictatorship, since it would come up against the bitter opposition of the majority of the population.[7]

If one remembers that Marx and Engels formulated exactly the Communists' goals, then it must be admitted that the Leninist teaching on a party of a new type, that is, a cadre organization of professional revolutionaries, is a legitimate addition to the teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat and at the same time the answer to the question as to *how* to realize this program. The legitimacy of this addition is confirmed by the fact that to date no other way of realizing what Marx termed the dictatorship of the proletariat has been found.

Amendments to Dogma

The problem of what should be considered the essence of Marxism, that is, Marxism in the exact sense of the word, is interesting not only from the theoretical standpoint. Researchers engaged in the study of Communism and the USSR are constantly coming up against one clear contradiction in the behavior of Communists. On the one hand, it would appear that Communists ought be fanatical adherents of a particular teaching, the theory of Marxism-Leninism, and ready to do anything for the implementation of their dogma. It is enough to

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[6] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, 1948, vol. II, p. 433.
[7] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 145; vol. II, p. 412 and 451.

recall the sacrifices demanded by the Communists from the population in the name of the building of socialism in order to reach such a conclusion. However, on the other hand, the dogmatic fanatics do at times amend dogma itself. These amendments may take the form of a change in the interpretation of a particular thesis, the dropping of a dogma, supplementing one principle or another, or else advancing entirely new postulates. An example of a new interpretation of an old dogma is Stalin's definition of the concept "equality" under socialism and Communism in a speech made at the Seventeenth Party Congress in January 1934, when he announced that "equality" did not imply "equality of consumption," and that it was necessary to combat the "leveling" policy which the Party had introduced in the first years after the Bolshevik Revolution in accordance with the directives of Marx and Engels, a policy according to which managers received the same wage as skilled workers.[8]

The dropping of a dogma may take place "in passing," as a matter of course, as was the case with Stalin's dismissal in his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* of Engels' thesis on the disappearance of large cities. It may take place "officially," with much pomp and ceremony, as was the case with the thesis on the withering away of the state under Communism, which was thrown overboard at the Eighteenth Party Congress.[9] An example of an "addition" to long-standing dogmas is furnished by Stalin's statement in the above-mentioned work that under Communism not every, but only the essential differences between the town and country and between mental and manual work would disappear, thus correcting Marx and himself. A further example is Khrushchev's amendment at the Twentieth Party Congress of the old Marxist thesis on the inevitability of wars as long as capitalism existed and his advancement of the principle of the possibility of averting such wars.[10] A brand-new dogma which appeared for the first time at the Twentieth Party Congress was the thesis of the possible peaceful seizure of power by the Communists. Thus, one cannot deny that dogmas are in fact amended. In this case the view that the Soviet leaders are dogmatic in their approach falls apart. Is it in fact possible to speak of a "blind belief in dogma" in cases when persons are ready to "believe" what was yesterday considered a heresy and to condemn as heretical something which yesterday was considered the truth?

A further question often raised is whether the Communists are pragmatists or at least on the way to pragmatism and whether talk of building Communism is merely a formal concession to tradition. At the Twenty-first Party Congress the Party leaders indicated that they intend to pursue their program to the end, the program for the building of a Communist society, thus giving the impression that they are fanatics and doctrinaires. How does one resolve this contradiction between amendments to some dogmas and the stubborn implementation of others? Is it explained by the arbitrariness of individuals, by pure chance, or is

[8] J. V. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems of Leninism), 11th ed., Moscow, 1948, p. 470.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 606; *Bolshevik*, No. 18 (1952), p. 14.

[10] *Bolshevik*, *op. cit.*, p. 16; *XX sezd KPSS : Stenograficheskiy otchet* (The Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party: Stenographic Report), Moscow, 1956, vol. I, p. 36.

some sort of regular pattern discernable? The answer to these questions is apparently that not every statement by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, or Khrushchev is "Marxism" in the strict sense of the word. Only those statements which serve a definite purpose, the establishment and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, the dictatorship of the Communist Party, are regarded as such. It follows that changes in dogma in themselves are by no means an indication "of the development of a Communist dictatorship toward pragmatism." Everything depends on which changes are being discussed. If one is speaking of changes which serve the ultimate goal, then they are what Communists consider them, a creative development of Marxism. Such changes not only do not contradict Marxism, but, on the contrary, are determined by it. If one remembers that for Marxists the criterion for all decisions is not the letter of the dogma, but the attempt to realize a definite program, then amendments to individual theses, which are inthinkable if Communism is a pseudoreligion, are necessary, inasmuch as the conditions under which this program is being carried out are constantly changing.

Marxism is not a Dogma, but a Guide to Action

By rendering the concept "Marxism" in concrete terms one can determine more exactly the role of ideology within the framework of the Soviet system. In the opinion of the author the most exact characterization of its role is the well-known maxim which can be traced back to Marx: "Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action." It would be more correct to say, "Marxism is a guide to action and hence not a dogma," since the basic function of Marxist theory is to teach its adherents how to act under particular circumstances in order to achieve definite aims. Often a change in one word signifies an alteration in policy. For example, both Stalin and Khrushchev, fully in accordance with Marxist tradition, stated that under Communism there can be only one form of property and not two, cooperative and state, as under socialism, and spoke of the need to introduce "gradually" this one form. However, Stalin talked of the necessity of "raising kolkhoz property to the level of national property," while Khrushchev spoke of the "approximation" of these two types of property. The first formula signified the transfer of the kolkhoz labor force to the control of the machine tractor stations, thus restricting in every way possible the income and powers of the kolkhozes; the second meant the disbanding of the machine tractor stations, the transfer of their machinery to the kolkhozes, and the granting of greater freedom of initiative to the kolkhozes. However, in both cases the individual "theses" are an exact instruction on how to act and in both cases they are pursuing one and the same goal, the strengthening of the dictatorship of the Party by the abolition of kolkhoz property which is the basis of the minimal independence of the kolkhozes.

In the light of the above facts the internal logic of these postulates and amendments to them becomes clear. The Communist leaders' stubborn defense of some, even the most senseless, postulates and their readiness to renounce apparently sacred dogmas also become clear. The Communists have, for instance,

maintained until now that a relative and absolute impoverishment of the proletariat can be observed as capitalism developes, in other words that a worker in the United States is worse off today then he was one hundred years ago. On the other hand, Communists have renounced the thesis of the absolute necessity to use force in order to seize power, a thesis which Lenin had considered one of the basic principles of Bolshevism. The thesis on the "relative and absolute impoverishment of the proletariat" is one of the justifications of the Communists' struggle for power and is in this sense "a guide to action." Of course the falsity of this thesis harms the Communists to a certain degree and provides anti-Communists with an opportunity to discredit Marxist teachings. However, the rejection of this thesis would not be of very much use from the standpoint of the dictatorship of the Party because it would cast doubts on Communist policy as a whole. The stubborn insistence on this principle, in spite of facts to the contrary, gives the Communists an opportunity to use it as a propaganda weapon to influence people and to argue that Marx was right when cases of a drop in the living standard of the peoples of the non-Communist countries take place for some reason or other, such as war or crop failure. The abandonment of the thesis that Communists can only come to power by the use of force and by a bloody revolution is, on the one hand, a directive to make energetic use of the opportunities for seizing power found in the system of parliamentary democracy and, on the other, it has helped in some measure to conceal the Communists' intention to seize power by force, that is, it is intended to deceive opponents. In other words one is dealing in both cases with a "guide to action," and not with dogmas which must be blindly followed.

A study of the history of the development of Marxist ideology will lead to the impression that it is by nature a "guide to action." Marx and Engels attempted to create a comprehensive *Weltanschauung*, although both of them were too engaged in practical activities to work out their views systematically. The same can be said of Lenin. Under Stalin Marxist ideology was coverted into a collection of postulates which were usually proclaimed *ex cathedra*, were not to be criticized or proved, and were amended by the Party leaders as political needs dictated. Not by chance was all Marxist "philosophy" of the Stalin era reduced to the commentaries on dialectical materialism in Chapter Four of *The Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party*, allegedly written by Stalin. After the denunciation of Stalin in 1956, Chapter Four ceased to represent the official viewpoint. At present the official document obligatory for the entire Communist world, with the exception of Yugoslavia, is the *Declaration of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries*, issued in 1957, which does not contain any philosophical principles and does not provide any "foundations of a *Weltanschauung*." Yet the document does state exactly what one must do in order to have the right to be called a Communist. It refers to "general laws" which comprise

> the leadership of the toiling masses by the working class, the nucleus of which is the Marxist-Leninist Party, in the carrying out of the proletarian revolution in one form or another and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one form

or another; the union of the working class with the main mass of the peasantry and other levels of workers; the abolition of capitalist property and the establishment of public ownership of the chief means of production; the gradual socialist reorganization of agriculture; the planned development of the economy, directed toward the building of socialism and Communism and the raising of the standard of living of the workers; the carrying out of the socialist revolution in the fields of ideology and culture and the creating of a large intelligentsia, devoted to the working class, to the toiling people, and to the cause of socialism; the removal of national oppression and the establishment of equality and brotherly friendship between peoples; the defense of the conquests of socialism from the encroachments of internal and external enemies; the solidarity of the working class of a particular country with the working class of other countries, proletarian internationalism.[11]

Each of these "general laws" represents a "guide to action" and is directed toward the achievement of a definite goal, the establishment and consolidation of the dictatorship of the Party. There is no need whatsoever to know German idealistic philosophy, French socialism, or English political economy in order to meet these requirements. The same can be said about any of the other program requirements which do not and were probably not intended to provide a "comprehensive *Weltanschauung*," but were formulated to compel one to act in a definite manner. At present "the immortal teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin" have been finally reduced to a collection of directives on the carrying out of particular political measures which can always be supplemented with other directives and from which, should the need arise, one or more directives can be dropped. Any émigré from the Soviet Union can confirm that at the latest at the beginning of the 1930's Marxism ceased to be a subject of controversy in the USSR and became the repetition of prepared formulas or a "guide to action." In the light of the above one involuntarily asks oneself whether in present conditions it is not rather a disadvantage for the Communist Party leaders to have persons who believe fanatically in dogmas and their immutability. Such persons are often unable to follow all the twists in the Party line which are necessary for the achievement of stipulated goals. The conflict between the "old guard" and Stalin, which ended with the physical elimination of the opposition during the show trials of the 1930's, was probably explained to a certain degree by the inability of the old revolutionaries to understand that "Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action."

Communism as an Expression of the Interests of Particular Groups

The question which arises here is, if the teachings of Marxism-Leninism are a doctrine of the dictatorship of Communist parties, why does this doctrine, in spite of its primitiveness, have such a large number of confirmed adherents? Communists often risk much in the name of the realization of the Marxist program and sometimes it is difficult to say who risks more, Communists operating in capitalist countries or Communists who are in power. The attractiveness of Marxism-Leninism is explained at different stages in its development by varied

[11] *Pravda*, November 22, 1957.

and numerous factors. Nonetheless, at any stage in its development one can always establish a direct connection between the idea of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the material interests of its standard bearers. This fact is most noticeable in those countries where the Communists are in power. Here there are a Party bureaucracy and professional Party workers, who number approximately 250,000 to 300,000 in the USSR. Including families the figure amounts to some 700,000 persons, that is, a rather large and powerful group for which the idea of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" is its *raison d'être*. Again, there are in the USSR about 8,000,000 Party members, comprising with families a group of over 18,000,000. The latter occupy the managerial and well paid positions far more often than persons who are not Party members. From these groups the so-called "genuine Communists" are recruited as a rule, that is, persons who at least say that they are firm believers in Communist teachings.

Thus, there is no need to presume that Marxism-Leninism provides a "comprehensive *Weltanschauung*" in order to explain its power of attraction under a Communist dictatorship. It is enough to remember the ordinary human desire to make a career or simply to live more or less well. It is a slightly more complicated matter to evaluate the reasons for the "attractiveness" of Marxism-Leninism to persons living in non-Communist countries. Yet even here there is a direct connection between the material interests of the supporters of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the idea itself. The starting point for adherence to Communism is always the negation of existing conditions and the "charm" of the theory is only a secondary consideration. There are very good reasons for the rise or growth of the Communist movement in Tsarist Russia, present-day France and Italy, India, China, and so on. Of course, reference to a negative attitude toward the existing system still does not explain adherence to a definite program to change conditions, to the program of Communism. However, even in this case there is no need to refer to the "pseudoreligious" belief of the adherents of Communism in their idea. Only a very small number of persons are involved. According to official Soviet data, on January 1, 1917, the Bolshevik Party numbered only 23,400 members in Tsarist Russia, out of population of 160,000,000. At the end of 1917, the Bolsheviks had succeeded in increasing the number of Party members to between 250,000 and 270,000, but this was a very small group in comparison with the population of the country. Moreover, the Party was not at that moment composed of persons who had studied Marxism-Leninism, but of participants in the Revolution, in the course of which people joined for different reasons, but very rarely as the result of the study of any theory. Further, as Lenin had already pointed out in 1902 in his work *What Is to be Done?*, the standard bearers of Communism were not workers, but representatives of the so-called revolutionary intelligentsia. For the representatives of this group the program for the creation of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" promised considerable advantages.

As is known, the basic point in the program of Marxism-Leninism is the demand for the abolition of private ownership of the means of production. As a result of the "expropriation" of the "expropriators," the abolition of private

ownership of the means of production, somebody has to manage the nationalized enterprises and tremendous opportunities for advancement are created, that is, to attain a status which without the Revolution was often attainable only as a result of long years of work. Of course, it is difficult to say to what degree ambition or mercenary motives played a decisive role in some cases, but there is every reason to assert that even in the course of the struggle for power the Bolsheviks consciously speculated with the desire of "future general directors" to obtain if not the right to possess the nationalized means of production, then at least the right to manage them after the nationalization of industry. None other than the founder of Bolshevism, Lenin, discussed in his pamphlet *Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?*, of October 14, 1917 (New Style), among other questions the problem as to whether the Bolsheviks would be able to cope with the management of industry and answered it with a reference to the following quotation from the newspaper *Izvestia*:

> On September 26, two engineers appeared in the Central Soviet of the Factory Committees with the statement that a group of engineers had decided to form a union of engineer-socialists. Considering that the present time was essentially the beginning of the social revolution, the union placed itself at the disposal of the working masses and wishes, protecting the interests of the workers, to act in full cooperation with the workers' organizations.[12]

Lenin himself added that there would be more such cases in the future after the seizure of power. In order to understand the actions of these two engineers there is no need to suspect them of adherence to a pseudoreligion; they had simply calculated that they had opportunity to make a brilliant career in connection with the "expropriation of the expropriators" and the transfer of the management of industry to new persons on a new basis. A few lines further on Lenin wrote:

> 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party . . . already have behind them now no less than one million votes . . ., since such is the relation of the number of Party members to the number of votes cast for it, established by experience in Europe and in Russia . . . . We already have a "state apparatus" of *one million* persons devoted to the socialist state ideologically, and not because they receive a large sum on the 20th of each month.[13]

Thus, Lenin, who in the period of the underground struggle demanded that the number of Party members be limited to professional revolutionaries, that is, theoretically speaking, to fanatics, promised at the decisive moment to make "bosses" not only of all the Party members, of whom more than 90% had belonged to the Party for less than half a year, but also of all the "fellow travelers" who voted for the Communists. To a certain extent the actions of these persons are explained by the desire to advance and by the decision to bet on a particular card, or to join the most radical revolutionary movement, a step which is often determined simply by temperament, age, personal ties, and so on.

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[12] V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*, 1952, XXVI, 86.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

What is true of the Russian Communists who were active before the Revolution is even more true of the Communists presently active in capitalist countries. There is little doubt that, say, those young Frenchmen who support Communism are well aware that their Russian or East German colleagues who have passed through the more or less stern school of struggle against the existing system have finally come to power and made a career. There is no reason whatsoever to regard Communists as persons with a halo of "idealism" about them. At best one is dealing with the type of idealism found among young cadets who at the beginning of their military career have a chance of either meeting a hero's death or else becoming a general. It goes without saying that the desire to make a career is not the only factor which makes Marxism-Leninism attractive. One factor is, for example, the need, advantage, and apparent expediency of cooperating with the second most powerful state in the world. Another very important factor which persuades persons to become Communists is their desire "to adapt themselves" to conditions, to take the side of the strong, "to play safe." Finally, one must not ignore the factor to which supporters of Marxism-Leninism who consider it a pseudoreligion give first place: belief in the righteousness of their cause or, at least, a belief in victory, although this belief is, in the author's opinion, explained not by the attraction of a "comprehensive *Weltanschauung*," but by what could be called the rational nucleus of Marxism.

Conclusions

The question as to whether contemporary Communism is a pseudoreligion or a "normal" political movement which reflects the interests of a definite group of people is of considerable importance for the practical field. The answer to the cardinal question of the reasons for the growth in the Communist movement in various countries and of how to combat it is bound up with the conclusion which one reaches. If one considers Communism a "pseudoreligion," then one must conclude that it can only be combatted with some sort of thought control. If one considers it to be a purely political movement and not a form of mass psychosis, then the most effective means of anti-Communist action is the carrying out of necessary reforms. Further, if the essence of Communism is defined exactly, then it will be easier to determine the best type of ideological struggle to be waged against it. If Communism is held to be a "pseudoreligion," then the only possible antidote is religion proper. However, it would be incorrect to believe that all atheists are Communists and in practice there are few cases of Communists being "converted" into anti-Communists under the influence of religion. If Communism is held to be a political phenomenon and Marxism-Leninism a "guide to action," then the assertion that Communism is a "pseudoreligion" is in essence unintentional propaganda in favor of Communism. The point is that the upholders of this view ascribe to Communism qualities which it does not possess. As pointed out above, the "immortal teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin" can be reduced to the doctrine of the dictatorship of the Communist Party and, at most, to a program of action. Under these circumstances

the most correct "line" in the ideological struggle against Communism is not to repeat Leninist assurances that Communism "provides people with a complete *Weltanschauung*," but to show the bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism, to show that Communists at times speak of these assurances as the "essence" of their teachings and not as its "component parts."

However, this is also only one side of the matter. Classical Communism attempts both to proclaim its doctrine the "lawful successor to the best that mankind has produced" and to draw a line between what Lenin called the "component parts" of Marxism-Leninism itself. This is a deliberate and carefully thought out policy. The reference to the "component parts" of Marxism and the Communists' claim to historical succession increase the authority of this doctrine in the eyes of both its adherents and, involuntarily, of its opponents too. On the other hand, the clear distinction between the "component parts" and "essence" of Marxism is needed, otherwise the realization of the program cannot be ensured. Lenin, for instance, correctly pointed out that whoever recognizes the class struggle, but not the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is not yet a Marxist. The most logical conclusion to be drawn from the theory of the class struggle, that is, from the recognition of the existence of social groups, which arise as a result of the division of labor and different interests, is not the demand to "prohibit" classes and to create a "classless" society in the form of a one-party dictatorship, but the demand for a parliamentary democracy. The same can be said of a great many other "postulates" emanating from the component parts of Marxism. One can obtain from a materialistic attitude toward life both the idea of the merciless exploitation of man by the state and the demand for the abolition of a costly bureaucratic machine, the running of the economy and the development of private initiative with the aim of providing the highest possible standard of living. From the idea that economic development determines the social structure of society one can obtain the insistence on the abolition of private property and, on the other hand, the recognition of the existence of private capital as an economic necessity, and so forth.

In the light of these considerations any attempt to refute Marxism by refuting its component parts, which is the normal practice of adherents of the view that Communism is a pseudoreligion, is bound to go wrong. Attacks are directed against materialism as such, against dialectics, and against a materialistic view of history, that is, in practice against the assertion that the social structure of society is to a decisive degree determined by economic development. Yet it is not difficult to see that these "three component parts" of Marxism represent its "rational nucleus." One can argue to what extent materialism offers a correct view of reality, to what extent the laws of dialectics reflect the development of reality, and to what extent economics determine the development of politics. However, there is no doubt that such arguments are much older than Communism and that one can, if one is a Hegelian for example, acknowledge the laws of dialectics, without being a Communist. The idea that Marxism is a "pseudoreligion," a "complete *Weltanschauung*," deprives the opponents of Marxism of the opportunity of using

the real achievements of the "component parts of Marxism" in the struggle against Communism. Experience has shown that former Communists or persons brought up in a Communist country cast off the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" comparatively easily, but not a materialistic view of history, the dialectical approach to reality, or materialistic philosophy. These and many other aspects of the "component parts of Marxism" are no less the legitimate results of free human thought than the rejection of determinism in history or the assertion that consciousness determines social being. Furthermore, it is these "component parts" of Marxism, and not the teaching on the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, which provide Marxism with its halo of a scientific nature and powers of attraction, especially in those cases when considerations of personal advantage are not the deciding factor. Emphasis on the distinction between the "essence" of Marxism and its "component parts" may help many to free themselves from the influence of Communism.

CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

The Economy

The Technical Level of Soviet Industry

Communist theory holds that the level and rate of technical development are dependent on the social and political conditions which have evolved in a country or in a particular period of history. It claims that only a society based on the principles of this theory contains the favorable conditions necessary for technical progress. The Kremlin is always quick to link the successes of Soviet science and engineering with the extremely rapid technological progress in the USSR in general. In other words, Communism, in accordance with its program of ideological and political struggle against the non-Communist world, is attempting to identify itself with technological progress, flaunting individual successes by Soviet scientists in the technical field as proof of the superiority of Soviet society.

Of course, the Soviet government is doing its utmost to step up research work and to train more scientists and engineers, besides making enormous demands on the population in order to complete the industrialization of the country. Yet at the same time it is unable to maintain a rapid and uniform growth of technology in all branches of the economy. Many technical achievements, if taken individually, by no means give a picture of the general technical level throughout the USSR as a whole. For years the Communist press has been proclaiming the superiority of Soviet technology. However, it has of late been compelled to admit that some branches of the economy are seriously lagging. The Soviet leaders have admitted that the country's technical development is far from smooth, in spite of constant propaganda to the contrary. The reports and speeches by the Party leaders and the innumerable articles in the Soviet press provide a rather clear picture of the degree of technical backwardness in industry and the uneven development of the country's productive forces.

Automation and remote control are presently the most advanced techniques in industrial production. Soviet propaganda accordingly urges that every attempt be made to develop them. *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta* of February 9, 1958, reported that at a special session of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1956 a resolution had been adopted

> to consider the problem of automation of production as one of the most important and pressing problems of Soviet science . . ., to extend the activities of the institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, of the academies of sciences of the union republics and the higher educational establishments in the field of automation.

Conferences were then held on the role of automation in the metallurgical, petroleum, chemical, power, paper-making, food, and light industries. However, the decisions of such conferences are not always put into effect. A group of engineers wrote in the same issue that

in most branches of the economy there is to date automation only of individual, unconnected units and processes. . . . As is known, the most effective [form] is complex automation, that is, the introduction of rationalization and automation throughout the productive process, from the raw material stage to the output of the finished product. . . . Almost thirty institutes and independent laboratories of the academy were set problems connected with automation, but concrete results from the work of most of them are not yet to be seen.

They further pointed out that the Soviet instrument-making industry by no means satisfies the needs of the economy. Many instruments, regulators, and so on are either not produced at all or only in limited quantities. Much equipment and apparatus produced by this industry cannot be used in automatic production. They write:

It must be stated that we have introduced very few practical measures to date in the field of automation, although the new achievements of physics, chemistry, mechanics, mathematics, and other sciences open up greater possibilities for the automation of production.

The magazine *Priborostroenie* particularly blames the machine-building industry for delaying in a number of cases the output of the means of mechanization for the most important branches of the economy. Ferrous and nonferrous metal mining enterprises have a low level of automation and lag far behind similar enterprises in the United States.[1] A major problem of the petroleum and chemical industry is the small degree of mechanization and automation of subsidiary operations. The magazine remarks that great use is made of automation in oil extraction in the United States. In the USSR there is not even one pumping station equipped with remote control. The magazine concludes:

In spite of specific successes in the automation of industry . . ., this important question has still not been given the necessary attention in our country. We were and still are behind certain foreign countries in automation, particularly the United States.[2]

Automation of production processes is thus still in an elementary stage in the USSR. Only a few hydroelectric power stations are completely automatic.[3] Even less use is made of remote control. In the power industry, where it is most widely applied, the central transmission points of only twenty power systems with half the country's total capacity make use of remote control.[4]

The problems involved in the introduction of mechanization and automation in the USSR are so great that economic plans envisage that an indefinite period of time will be needed for their solution. *Pravda* of December 6, 1958 puts the problem in the following terms:

One of the outstanding features of the forthcoming Seven-Year Plan as a decisive step in the creation of the material and technical basis of Communism

[1] *Priborostroenie*, No. 5 (1958), p. 8.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[3] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, May 1, 1958.

[4] A. V. Topchiev, *Stroitelstvo kommunizma i nauka* (The Building of Communism and Science), Moscow, 1957, p. 17.

is that during this period the complex mechanization of production processes will be mainly completed, and the transition from the automation of individual units or sectors to complex automation, to the creation of completely automatic shops, technological processes, and enterprises, will begin.

Judging by Soviet sources, about 150 automatic and semiautomatic production lines are being installed annually in industry,[5] and by 1965 it is planned to install from 250 to 271 automatic and semiautomatic lines per year.[6]

The low level of development of automation and industrial techniques is revealed by the enormous amount of obsolescent machinery, machine tools, and other equipment in the USSR. The most important prerequisite for the development of mechanical engineering is naturally the supply of new and up-to-date equipment, primarily metal-cutting lathes. The Soviet industry has a stock of about 2,000,000 metal-cutting lathes.[7] About 50% of them, 1,000,000 in all, are more than ten years old, while 18%, or 360,000, are more than twenty years old. Further, more than 40% of all machine tools, some 800,000 tools, consist of the simplest kind of lathes, which, by the way, are still being produced. Output of specialized and aggregate machine tools has not grown in relation to the total number of machine tools produced. Many large-scale enterprises in the country are thus still without them.[8] There are only about 130,000 automatic and semiautomatic machine tools, which is about 6.5% of all machine tools in the USSR.[9] Most of the equipment even of such comparatively new and technically advanced enterprises as plants manufacturing tractors, automobiles, and bearings is twenty-five years old.[10]

In 1958, 138,000 machine tools were produced. Of these, only 13.8% or 19,000 were specialized and aggregate machine tools.[11] With the present system of allocation, the problem of replacing obsolete machine tools is an insoluble one under Soviet conditions. About one half of all new tools goes to enterprises presently being built; 10% to 15% are exported, and only the remaining 35% to 40% are actually used to replace obsolete machine tools.[12] With this allocation system, it will take from 35 to 40 years to replace the present 2,000,000 machine tools, not counting those delivered annually to enterprises under construction. The annual growth in output of metal-cutting lathes planned for 1959–65 is to be between 7,000 and 8,500 units,[13] which will not effect the estimate of the time needed to replace obsolete machine tools. Soviet economist Vorotilov estimates that with the present rate of production of metal-cutting lathes and the above-mentioned principle of allocation, only from 3% to 4% of the old lathes will be

[5] *Pravda*, January 16, 1959.
[6] *Ibid.*, December 11, 1958.
[7] *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 5 (1958), pp. 47–48.
[8] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, January 22, 1958.
[9] *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 5 (1958), p. 54.
[10] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, January 22, 1958.
[11] *Pravda*, December 11, 1958, and January 16, 1959.
[12] *Sotsialisticheskiy trud*, No. 5 (1958), p. 35.
[13] *Pravda*, December 11, 1958,

replaced with new ones annually,[14] that is, complete replacement will take from 25 to 30 years. During this time, however, not only the machine tools due for replacement, but even the new ones sent to new enterprises will have become obsolete. According to a report by Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR E. Varga, "the American metal-working industry replaced almost all its machine tools with new ones during the war,"[15] even though, as the Soviet economist Y. Kvasha adds, fully half of them were less than ten years old.[16] The two countries have about the same number of machine tools, but Soviet industry is far behind its United States counterpart in production. In 1958, the USSR put out 138,000 machine tools, whereas the United States was producing 217,000 in 1953.[17]

The situation is the same as regards press forging machinery. In 1957, the USSR had 385,000 units, and annual production was only 24,600 units in 1958. Some of these units were used for expansion purposes, while others went for export. If one presumes that 60% of the equipment produced, about 15,000 units annually, will replace equipment now in use, without taking into consideration the annual increase as a result of expansion of production, complete replacement will take more than 25 years. The annual growth planned for output of this equipment in 1959–65 is only 1,600 units,[18] which will have no substantial effect on speeding up replacement of obsolete equipment. *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta* of January 26, 1958 wrote: "Designers should create machines which will have a much higher productivity than those now in existence and which will still be up-to-date 5 to 10 years after they are put into mass production." *Planovoe khozyaistvo* reports that often even new equipment is already obsolescent by the time it is put into operation.[19]

The food and light industries are the most backward. Soviet economists estimate that it will take from 15 to 20 years to provide the textile industry with modern equipment.[20] But even these calculations are optimistic, since there are not enough plants producing machinery for the light industry. In the few that do exist 80% to 90% of their equipment is obsolete.[21] The footwear industry still only receives old-type machines with low productivity; many production processes are still done by hand, while the production of automatic equipment for this branch of the economy is not running smoothly.[22] For this reason, the manufacturing enterprises, scientific establishments, and designing bureaus are still faced with the problem of the creation and mastery of new machines for light industry before it will be possible to raise the question of replacing old ones.

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[14] *Sotsialisticheskiy trud*, No. 5 (1958), p. 35.

[15] E. Varga, *Izmeneniya v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroi mirovoi voiny* (Changes in the Capitalist Economy as a Result of World War II), Moscow, 1946, p. 124.

[16] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 7 (1958), p. 99.

[17] *Sotsialisticheskiy trud*, No. 5 (1958), p. 35.

[18] *Pravda*, December 11, 1958, and January 16, 1959.

[19] *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 5 (1958), p. 47.

[20] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, March 7, 1958.

[21] *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 12 (1958), pp. 80–82.

[22] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, February 7, 1958: *Pravda*, December 11, 1958.

Unable to cope with the problem of rapidly replacing obsolete equipment, the Soviet government calls for modernization, i.e., for better performance and higher productivity. Modernization of obsolescent equipment is being advanced as a pressing current problem. Economist Vorotilov writes:

> The large-scale modernization of equipment acquires particularly great importance now when the problem of overcoming, in the near future, the lag of a number of industries behind advanced enterprises at home and abroad in the technological field is being resolved.[23]

Economist A. Prokopovich advised raising productivity by eliminating losses of working time and making more rational use of equipment. He also hoped that a certain amount of remodeling would raise the performance of most machine tools to the level of modern equipment and considers the first necessity to be modernization of machine tools that are from 10 to 20 years old.[24] How slowly technical problems are solved in manufacturing enterprises can be seen from a speech by N. Zubkov, one of the heads of the State Committee for Building Affairs:

> Modernization and renovation of equipment have to date not been widely applied at all in machine-building plants. There are as yet only isolated cases of productive power being increased in this way. And they, of course, do not set the pattern.

Further, even the enterprises now being built were designed several years ago, and will have equipment and technological processes which are already obsolete.[25]

One of the major problems of Soviet industrial technology is reducing the weight and size of machines and bettering their performance. The point is that the USSR is still turning out machines and equipment which are poorly designed. As *Planovoe khozyaistvo* writes, solving the problem of combining high-power machinery with minimum dimensions and weight is retarded, in most cases, by the use of standard designs, which leads to the constant use of existing construction plans, with only a few alterations being made. The extravagant use of steel in machine production is also tolerated because of the limited output of the necessary types of rolled and sheet steel, and so on. The engineering industry still does not use enough aluminum alloys, while the use of magnesium and titanium alloys is only in the experimental stage. The use of low-alloy steel instead of the normal carbon steel in a number of branches of the machine-building industry and in construction work would, according to Soviet economists, lead to a reduction of as much as 20% in steel consumption.[26]

The electrical industry is still producing electric motors that are not economical; they are cumbersome and heavy, and use too much power. In addition, the number of models available is very limited and does not meet the demands of

[23] *Sotsialisticheskiy trud*, No. 5 (1958), p. 35.
[24] *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 5 (1958), p. 49.
[25] *Pravda*, March 10, 1958.
[26] *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 12 (1958), pp. 38–44.

machine-building plants.[27] Generators are heavy, bulky, and inefficient.[28] The equipment in the Kiev Relay and Automatic Plant is inferior to the best models in foreign plants.[29] The quality of diesel motors is also low; after only 2,500 to 3,000 hours of operation they have to be overhauled or even replaced.[30] The quality of the ESh-4/40 excavator, the new E-652 excavator, and other earth-moving machinery is low and they have structural faults.[31] The recently built KU-1 coal-cutter has various shortcomings.[32] The Chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk Sovnarkhoz writes that "the development of the mining industry is retarded by the absence of new types of machinery and mechanisms. The equipment produced by the machine builders is clearly not up to contemporary technology."[33]

There are many unsolved problems in the pipe-rolling industry. The centrifugal casting machines designed by the research institutes are inferior in quality and in construction to foreign machines.[34] Yet Gosplan is not particularly interested and pays no attention to the problem of modernizing plants.[35] In the United States, France, and West Germany cast-iron pipes are now replacing steel pipes. Depending on the quality of the insulation, steel pipes last for from 5 to 20 years in the earth, whereas cast-iron pipes can be used for 100 years or more. In West Germany, for example, 84% of all gas and sewerage pipes are made of cast-iron. In the USSR practically no cast-iron pipes are produced. Cast-iron pipes are also more expensive than steel pipes, while in the West the situation is quite the reverse. This is explained by the fact that Soviet foundries manufacture cast-iron pipes by the vertical, and not by the modern centrifugal method.[36] The quality of the founding equipment produced is still very low, and often the structural shortcomings of machines are not discovered until they are already in use.[37] Tin-plating equipment designed by research institutes has proved to be completely useless in operation. Mechanisms and parts have had to be replaced within a matter of days.[38]

Agriculture is short of machines specifically adapted to the type of soil or meteorological conditions found in certain zones of the country. The problem of the designing of such machines has already been raised on many occasions at various meetings, but practically no machinery has appeared.[39] Nor can it be developed at all rapidly or effectively, since there are only two centers specializing

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[27] *Izvestia*, December 3, 1957.
[28] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, May 4, 1958.
[29] *Ibid.*, January 22, 1958.
[30] *Izvestia*, December 3, 1957.
[31] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, February 5 and 14, 1958.
[32] *Ibid.*, February 16, 1958.
[33] *Izvestia*, January 24, 1958.
[34] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, January 17, 1958.
[35] *Ibid.*, February 5, 1958.
[36] *Ibid.*, December 21, 1958.
[37] *Pravda*, December 1, 1957.
[38] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, February 12, 1958.
[39] *Izvestia*, April 8, 1958.

in the mechanization of agriculture in the country; the other agricultural centers mainly work on secondary problems, not on the problem of new agricultural machines.[40] About 2 billion rubles have been spent on the designing and manufacture of cotton-pickers over the last 11 years, yet the machines produced are unsatisfactory, and the cotton crop is still harvested mainly by hand. Secretary of the Uzbek Party Central Committee Kamalov has admitted that very little mechanization of labor-consuming processes has been introduced and that some processes are not mechanized at all. The tractors delivered are not suitable for work on the cotton fields.[41] Little has been done to introduce self-propelled machinery into agriculture. According to Soviet estimates, such machines are from 30% to 35% lighter than tractor-drawn machinery, much easier to manufacture and use, and are more productive; their use in agriculture would release about one million operators. The cultivation of sugar beets, potatoes, or vegetables is by no means completely mechanized; satisfactory machinery has not yet been designed for harvesting hay, bailing straw, cutting peat, quarrying lime, and so on. Too much loading and unloading work on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes is done by hand.[42]

The situation is by no means satisfactory as far as railroad transportation is concerned. The new types of railway cars built as late as 1955 have major structural faults. In the following year new railway cars were manufactured, using corrected plans, but even they had defects. In 1957, the same thing happened with new railway cars again.[43] The main problem is reducing weight and increasing durability; metallurgical plants have not as yet been able to deliver parts made of low-alloy steel.[44] The TE-3 steam locomotives and the VL-23 and N 8 electric locomotives now being manufactured still have serious structural defects.[45]

The following is typical of industry in the USSR. The first direct-flow boiler began operating in the USSR in 1933. To date only 29 direct flow high- and ultrahigh-pressure boilers with a total generating capacity of 6,300 tons per hour have been installed in Soviet power stations. This is less than 5% of the country's total generating capacity. In West Germany, by way of comparison, from 1948 to 1956 alone, the capacity of such boilers reached 15,800 tons of steam an hour.[46]

However, not only individual types of machines, and instruments are technically behind those of other countries; entire production processes are not yet up to the level of modern technology. The use of oxygen in the steel industry is an effective new technique permitting a sharp increase in the output of steel–25% to 30%, with a considerable saving in electric power–30% to 35%, and expensive alloys–up to 40%. By 1960 only 40% of steel produced will be

[40] *Mekhanizatsiya i elektrifikatsiya sotsialisticheskogo selskogo khozyaistva*, No. 1 (1958), pp. 1–2.

[41] *Pravda*, December 5, 1958.

[42] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, December 17, 1958.

[43] *Ibid.*, January 29, 1958.

[44] *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 12 (1958), p. 43.

[45] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, December 19, 1958.

[46] *Ibid.*, May 4, 1958.

oxygen-blown.[47] Electrometallurgy in the USSR is being developed mainly with small and medium furnaces. The capacity of the largest electric furnaces is 30 to 40 tons, whereas those most widely used in the United States hold 70 to 80 tons and there are also some with a capacity of 115 and even 180 tons. Over the next few years output of welder metal is to comprise only 6.9% of all steel and ferroalloys produced.[48] A very important trend in the development of blast furnaces is the increase in the capacity of the furnaces. The capacity of the largest blast furnaces in the USSR is now 1,386 cubic meters; blast furnaces in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany have capacities of more than 1,500 cubic meters. Some in the United States have more than 1,810 cubic meters.[49]

In the same industry rolling mills produce rolled steel of such dimensions that it later has to be further processed by the industries receiving it. In all, rolled steel is only manufactured to about 600 different specifications. A. Osintsev writes:

> The lag of the USSR in production of finished rolled steel can be judged by certain foreign catalogues which show [rolled steel with] as many as 12,000 different specifications intended for construction and the various branches of the machine-building industry.[50]

The main reasons for the production lag are: (1) the existing system of planning by tonnage, which does not stimulate production of new, lighter, and more economical types of rolled steel and (2) designs for the reconstruction of old rolling mills and new mills being built do not make provision for manufacturing a wider assortment of rolled steels.[51]

Although a comparatively large amount of power equipment has been introduced into the petroleum industry, and a first-class drilling machine is now available, the steam turbine drill, the quality of the drilling is, nevertheless, low. This is because the workers are urged to fulfill the drilling plan as fast as possible.[52] High-speed drilling thus becomes an end in itself; the workers are not interested in technical improvements. For this reason and a number of others, there is a lag of about four years between prospecting and exploitation in the Soviet oil industry.[53]

In the chemical industry the Soviets are far behind the West. The production of synthetics such as plastics, artificial fibers, and synthetic rubber is lagging. These materials are produced by obsolete methods; modern methods and new chemical equipment have not yet even been developed. For the production of ethyl alcohol, rubber, soap, drying oil, lubricants, and detergents, such valuable

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[47] A. Osintsev, *Chernaya metallurgiya SSSR na novom podeme* (A New Rise in Soviet Ferrous Metallurgy), Moscow, 1958, pp. 39–41; V. Sominsky, *O tekhnicheskom progresse promyshlennosti SSSR* (Technical Progress in Soviet Industry), Moscow, 1957, p. 65.

[48] A. Osintsev, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–44.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[51] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, December 28, 1958.

[52] *Ibid.*, January 8, 1958.

[53] *Pravda*, December 17, 1957.

food products as grain, potatoes, molasses, and so on are still being used. For example, 22 tons of potatoes or from 8 to 9 tons of rye are needed to produce one ton of synthetic rubber.[54] The use of plastics to replace nonferrous metals is restricted, because Soviet designers know very little about the qualities and characteristics of plastics, and because the amount and variety of plastic materials produced are severely limited.[55] In the United States there are about 500,000 petroleum compounds, and their number is constantly increasing. In the USSR the chemical industry makes very little use of petroleum and gas. Gases are particularly wasted in the main oil regions of the Tatar and Bashkir republics and Kuibyshev Oblast.[56]

The Party leaders introduced at a Central Committee plenary session, in May 1958, a resolution on ways of overcoming the lag in the chemical industry. In his report, Khrushchev said:

> The chemical equipment being produced by the machine-building industry is often technically behind the best models of foreign countries . . .
>
> Serious shortcomings in the organization of research work in the field of synthetic materials are one of the main reasons for the lag in new branches of the chemical industry. . .
>
> The degree of automation in the plants of the chemical industry is still very low.[57]

There is also an enormous disproportion between the degrees of mechanization of basic and subsidiary processes. More than 35% of the employees in the steel industry do manual labor; more than 50% of the workers in the machine-building industry also do manual labor.[58] In the radio and electrical engineering industries the figure is 67%. In the chemical industry, 83% of all workers do subsidiary tasks. In the food and light industries, which employ about 4,000,000 persons, partial mechanization of individual production processes alone would reduce this figure by 20% to 30%, and complete mechanization and automation by 60% to 70%.[59] Even in power stations the number of workers is very high. *Priborostroenie* writes: "We have three times as many employees per 1,000 kilowatts of installed capacity in our thermal power stations as there are in power plants in the United States."[60] According to reports in the Soviet press, of a total of 16,000,000 industrial workers in the USSR, several million are employed in loading and unloading work alone; if such work were mechanized and made automatic, from 76% to 85% of these workers[61] would be released for other work.

The Kremlin is constantly urging its bureaucracy and the people as a whole to help increase the rates of industrial development, particularly of heavy industry; from time to time it adopts decisions on the development of particular

[54] Sominsky, *op. cit.*, p. 141.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 151.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 169; *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 12 (1958), p. 32.
[57] *Pravda*, May 10, 1958.
[58] *Priborostroenie*, No. 5 (1958), p. 10.
[59] V. Sominsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 174–175.
[60] *Priborostroenie*, No. 5 (1958), p. 10.
[61] V. Sominsky, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

branches of the economy, as it did at the May 1958 Party Central Committee plenary session on the chemical industry. The Soviet press has admitted that although

> Soviet engineers and workers in industrial enterprises are attaining the best indices in the world through their use of various aggregates and machines . . ., nevertheless, for overall labor productivity figures, the Soviet Union is still considerably behind the level of labor productivity in the United States.[62]

This is because the Soviet economic system, with its centralization and bureaucracy, lack of private initiative, or free competition, does not offer any stimulus to develop and improve technology. Under such conditions, personal interest, no matter how much it is encouraged by the Soviet government with incentives and bonuses, still remains an artificial creation. The industrial and market organization of the Communist dictatorship not only does not aid, on the contrary, it hinders the development of industrial techniques and productive power in general.

Joseph J. Baritz

Electric Power and the Seven-Year Plan

The Seven-Year Plan envisages a growth in overall Soviet output by 80% over the 1958 level by the year 1965, including 85%–88% for output of producer goods. During the same period there is to be an increase of 110% to 120% in output of electric power. In other words, the plan is intending to concentrate on this branch of the Soviet economy.[1] The long-range plan for the development of the Soviet economy over the next fifteen years also intends to maintain this rapid development of output of electric power. Thus, while output in the key branches of heavy industry in 1972 will show a 100% to 200% increase over 1957, output of electric power is to increase by 330%.[2] In absolute figures, output of electric power, which stood at 233 billion kilowatt-hours in 1958, should, according to the plan, reach 500 billion to 520 billion kilowatt-hours in 1965 and 800 billion to 900 billion in 1972.[3]

Along with the general growth in consumption of electric power in all branches of the economy, demand has skyrocketed in recent years in industry and construction, which now account for 80% to 82% of all electric power. The forthcoming expansion of those branches of industry dependent on electric power, particularly in the fields of electrometallurgy and electrochemistry, and the planned increases in the smelting of nickel, magnesium, titanium, and aluminum, something like 180% to 200%, given a growth in output of electric steel by 100% by 1965 in comparison with the 1958 level, indicate that heavy

[62] *Priborostroenie*, No. 5 (1958), p. 1.

[1] *Pravda*, January 28, 1959.

[2] *Ibid.*, November 7, 1957.

[3] *Ibid.*, November 7, 1957; January 16 and 28, 1959.

industry will be by far the greatest consumer of electric power in the USSR during the next seven years. By 1965, there is also to be a significant growth in the electric power demands of agriculture, up to 25 billion kilowatt-hours or 300% more than in 1958.[4] In 1957, agriculture consumed 5.4 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power. Of this figure, 3.6 billion were supplied by small kolkhoz power stations and 1.8 billion by the state power system and industrial power stations, to which agricultural, production was coupled quite slowly. The Seven-Year Plan provides for the completion of the electrification of the kolkhozes; kolkhoz production is to be coupled with the state power system and the major power stations. By 1965, a further 20,000 kilometers of railroad tracks are to have been electrified, an increase of 200%. Although to date electrified stretches have operated on direct current, of the 20,000 kilometers due to be converted, 11,000 are to be run on alternating current. Capital investments will accordingly be reduced by 20% and the amount of copper used reduced by 200%. In all, railroad transportation is by 1965 to account for 40 billion kilowatt-hours, that is 34 billion more than in 1958 when, with a total of 9,500 kilometers of electrified tracks, over 6 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity were consumed.[5] Normal consumption of electric power by the population at large is to be doubled by 1965.

In 1958, Soviet electric power stations had a capacity of 53,100,000 kilowatts. Thermal power stations produced 80.5% of this figure, and hydroelectric plants 19.5%. In the postwar period the Soviets have concentrated on the building of large power stations. Thus in 1957, small stations, with a capacity of up to 500 kilowatts, produced 7 billion kilowatt-hours, or 3.4% of the total; stations with a capacity of between 500 and 10,000 kilowatts produced 16 billion kilowatt-hours, or 7.7%; those with from 10,000 to 100,000 kilowatt capacities produced 53 billion kilowatt-hours, or 25%. Nearly 64% of all electric power was produced at the 109 power stations with capacities of 100,000 kilowatts or more.[6]

Capacity and Output of Soviet Power Stations, 1928–58

	CAPACITY (Million Kilowatts)		OUTPUT (Billion Kilowatt-Hours)	
	Total	HPS	Total	HPS
1928	1.9	0.1	5.0	0.4
1932	4.7	0.5	13.5	0.8
1937	8.2	1.0	36.2	4.2
1940	11.2	1.6	48.3	5.1
1945	11.1	1.3	43.3	4.8
1950	19.6	3.2	91.2	12.7
1955	37.3	6.0	170.2	23.2
1956	43.5	8.5	191.7	29.0
1957	48.4	10.0	209.6	39.4
1958	53.1	10.9	233.0	45.7

SOURCES: A. M. Nekrasov, *Razvitie energetiki SSSR v 1959—1965 gg.* (The Development of Soviet Electric Power, 1959—65), Moscow, 1959, p. 7; *Pravda*, January 16, 1957.

[4] A. M. Nekrasov, *Razvitiya energetiki SSSR v 1959–1965 gg.* (The Development of Soviet Electric Power, 1959–65), Moscow, 1959, p. 5.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Over the past 30 years, the capacity and output of power stations in the USSR, including hydroelectric power stations (HPS), have grown as shown in the table on the preceding page.

In the next seven years electric power output is to rise to 500 billion to 520 billion kilowatt-hours and by 1972 it is to be approximately 800 billion to 900 billion kilowatt-hours. Capacity is to be increased to 110,000,000 to 112,000,000 kilowatts by 1965, mainly by increasing capacity of the thermal power stations by between 47,000,000 and 50,000,000 kilowatts, and that of the hydroelectric plants by 10,000,000 to 11,000,000.[7] However, even in 1972, the Soviet Union will still be lagging behind the United States in output of electric power. In spite of Soviet attempts to step-up output, in 1958 the USSR was still producing less than 50% as much electric power as the United States, as the following table shows:

Comparison of Soviet and US Output of Electric Power, 1928–58

(Billion Kilowatt–Hours)

	USSR	USA
1928	5.0	108.1
1940	48.3	179.9
1948	66.3	336.8
1958	233.0	716.2
Increase in Output (1948–58)	166.7	379.4

SOURCE: *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2 (1959), p. 42.

United States per capita output of electric power was 4,200 kilowatt-hours in 1957, while, if the Seven-Year Plan is fulfilled, Soviet output will only be 2,231 kilowatt-hours per capita in 1965 and in 1972, 3,515 kilowatt-hours, if the long-range plan is fulfilled. In the meantime, the United States will not, of course, be marking time.

With the aim of increasing electric power output and maintaining the growth in heavy industry during the next seven years, preference is to be given to the building of thermal power stations, running on cheap coal, fuel oil, and natural gas. There will accordingly be a reduction in the building of hydroelectric stations, which take much longer to build than thermal stations under Soviet conditions. In 1965, 85% of electric power output will come from thermal power stations and 15% from hydroelectric stations. By 1972, total capacity will reach 180,000,000 to 200,000,000 kilowatts, still far behind United States capacity. The USSR has made enormous strides in the field of electric power in the postwar period. This applies not only to the capacity of those power stations presently under construction, but also to units currently coming into operation. In 1958, the Regional Electric-Power Station Network (GRES) had 58 steam turbines with capacities of 100,000 kilowatts and 5 steam turbines with capacities of 150,000 kilowatts.[8] In May 1959, work began at the South Urals Regional Power Station on the installation of the first turbine generator in the USSR with a capacity of 200,000 kilowatts. It is scheduled to begin working in September

[7] *Pravda*, November 14, 1958.

[8] *Elektricheskie stantsii*, No. 1 (1959), p. 2.

1959.[9] At the Leningrad Metal Plant, the preparation of designs for three-cylinder turbines with capacities of 300,000 and 400,000 kilowatts has been completed. At the same plant, the rough designs of a one-cylinder turbine with a capacity of 500,000 kilowatts have been finished, while a turbine with a 600,000-kilowatt capacity is also being planned.[10] The branch of industry supplying machinery for power stations is now able to manufacture boilers and turbines with an initial parametric pressure of 1,911 lbs. per square inch and 565°C. As a result, many of the units brought into operation in recent years, excluding small thermal stations, have been high pressure units. In 1958, the high-pressure turbines found in GRES accounted for more than 60% of total capacity, although eight years earlier, in 1950, they had made up only 20%. This has meant better utilization of fuel in Soviet power stations. The expansion of the size of power stations and units has made possible the reduction in personnel in 1958 to half and in the electric network to two thirds that of 1950.[11]

However, by no means all sections of GRES and GES, hydroelectric power stations, have automatic and mechanized processes. The transportation and fuel sectors are in an unsatisfactory state in this respect, which is the main reason for labor productivity lagging so far behind that at United States power stations:

> . . . in this field we are still far behind the United States, not only in scale of output of electric power, but also in overall use of electrical machinery and equipment in industrial work, approximately 100% behind. As for the level of automation in electric power stations, . . . in the USSR there are about nine workers for every 1,000 kilowatts of capacity in electric power stations, and in the United States, according to American statistics, one third as many.[12]

In spite of the large numbers of engineers, technical personnel, and skilled workers employed at the power stations the accident rate is still very high in absolute figures. In some regions it is on the increase, examples being the Donbas, Sverdlovsk, Rostov, Lithuanian, Dnepr, and Bashkir areas.[13]

In 1958, various new power stations and units came into operation. The world's largest hydroelectric plant, the Volga Lenin Hydroelectric Power Station, played a major part in improving supplies of electric power in the central regions of the USSR. At the end of 1958, three primary units of the Stalingrad Hydroelectric Power Station and a number of major sections in the Staro-Beshevo Power Station in the Donbas and the Tom-Usinsk in the Kuzbas began operating. At the station on the Dnepr River, the first Soviet units built of perlite steel, with a capacity of 150,000 kilowatts, began operating. The Irkutsk Power Station on the Angara River and the Lugansk began operating in 1958 at full capacity. The first sections of new Vasilevichi Thermal Power Station in Belorussia, the Ashkhabad, Saransk, and others also began working. Three medium-

[9] *Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, May 20, 1959.

[10] *Ibid.*, March 11, 1959.

[11] *Elektricheskie stantsii*, *op. cit.*, pp. 2–3.

[12] S. G. Strumilin, *Zadachi ekonomicheskikh nauk v oblasti avtomatizatsii proizvodstva* (The Tasks of the Economic Sciences in the Field of the Automation of Production), Moscow, 1957, p. 220.

[13] *Elektricheskie stantsii*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

capacity hydroelectric stations, the Perepadnaya in Tadzhikistan, the Iriklinsky in the Southern Urals, and the Gumati in Georgia, also started working. Powerful new turbogenerators began working at various thermal power stations already in operation. The new units were installed not only in the European USSR, but also in the eastern regions. Much work was done in 1958 extending the network of transmission lines: the Kuibishev–Southern Urals transmission line, with a voltage of 500 kilovolts, was built. It links the two major power systems of the central regions and the Urals. New lines of 220 kilovolts, uniting the power systems of Azerbaidzhan and Georgia, the Donbas and Kharkov, and others, were also constructed. All in all, about 2,000 kilometers of new transmission lines came into operation in 1958.

Disruptions in plans for the completion of new turbines, boilers, electric transmission lines, and so on have meant that the annual plan for increase in capacity has not been fulfilled. As a result, many economic regions experienced difficulties during the peak consumption periods, the fall and winter, in meeting demand in 1958–59, because of a shortage of reserve capacity.[14] A further problem is the failure to ensure an even distribution of new units throughout the year, as the following table shows:

Rate of Introduction of New Units in Soviet Electric Power Stations in 1958
(Percentage of Annual Total)

	Turbines	Boilers
First Quarter	5	12
Second Quarter	13	13
Third Quarter	17	20
Fourth Quarter	65	55

SOURCE: *Elektricheskie stantsii*, No. 1 (1959), p. 3.

In order to improve and speed up construction work, particularly of thermal power stations, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR formed the Ministry of Power Station Construction of the USSR, abolishing the Ministry of Power Stations of the USSR. The recent course of stepping up the construction of thermal power stations does not mean that hydroelectric power station construction is to be completely ignored in the USSR. In 1959 and the succeeding years of the Seven-Year Plan, work already begun on hydroelectric stations will be continued. New hydroelectric power stations will only be built in those regions devoid of fuel reserves.

As mentioned above, out of a total of 60,000,000 kilowatts called for in the seven year period, 50,000,000 will come from thermal power stations and the remaining 10,000,000 from hydroelectric stations presently under construction. Of these 10,000,000 kilowatts, 2,560,000 will come from the Stalingrad Station and 1,000,000 from the Votkinsk. Moreover, during the Seven-Year Plan the Bukhtarma (525,000 kilowatts), Kremenchug (625,000), Dneprodzerzhinsk, Khramsk, and Landzhanuri power stations are to begin operating.[15] Work on the

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.*, No. 3 (1959), p. 2.

major Krasnoyarsk Power Station, with a capacity of 4,200,000 kilowatts on the Enisei River, is to be stepped up. This station will supply electric power far cheaper than could be obtained from thermal power stations with a similar capacity. Nonetheless, the general trend for 1959—65 is, as pointed out already, to build thermal power stations, using coal, fuel oil, and natural gas. By 1965, more than 150 turbines are to have been installed in new or expanded thermal power stations. Along with the increase in the individual capacity of the turbines and boilers, there is also to be a major increase in the capacity of the thermal power stations themselves. Of those power stations presently under construction, 25 will have capacities of from 1,000,000 to 2,400,000 kilowatts each.[16] In accordance with the plan, total thermal power station capacity will reach 52,000,000 kilowatts, of which 65% will be produced by units of 100,000 kilowatts or above. Some of the major thermal power stations presently being built are the Vasilevichi in the Belorussian SSR; the Zmiev, Lugansk, Dnepr, and Staro-Beshevo in the Ukrainian SSR; the Kirov, Krasnoyarsk, Nazarovo, Troitskoe, Chita, Tom-Usinsk, and Southern Urals in the RSFSR; the Karaganda No. 2 in the Kazakh SSR; and the Navoisk in the Uzbek SSR. The fact that many of the stations scheduled for construction during the Seven-Year Plan will use gas or liquid fuels will speed up the construction period by about 8 months and reduce capital investments by 25% in comparison with the power stations built to date, which have used powdered coal.

The use of natural gas and fuel oil as fuels in thermal power stations will thus reduce air pollution, enabling power stations to be built actually inside the major cities. This will in turn reduce capital expenditure on the construction of electric transmission and municipal heating lines.[17] Thermal power stations operating on gas and liquid fuels will apparently be centered in large industrial cities and in those areas of the USSR which are dependent on supplies of fuel from other regions of the country or where local fuel is costly. These regions are the Transcaucasus; the South; Central Asia; and the central areas, particularly Moscow and Leningrad. Greater use of natural gas and fuel oil is also to be made in those thermal power stations already in operation. In the southern regions of the USSR open-type thermal power stations are to be built, thus reducing costs by 4%, and speeding up work by six months. A resolution of the Ministry of Power Station Construction of the USSR calls for the building of the following open-type thermal power stations over 1959—65 in the southern areas of the USSR: the Ali-Bairamly, Krasnodar, Nevinomysek, Tbilisi, Kishinev, and Novocherkassk.[18] At the Soviet economic exhibition, held in the summer of 1959, a model of the Ali-Bairamly open-type thermal power station, the first station of this type in the USSR, was on display in the Azerbaidzhan pavilion.[19] To date, no open-type thermal power stations have been built, despite the fact that favorable climatic conditions are available in many areas. Now that the USSR is engaging in econo-

[16] A. M. Nekrasov, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
[17] *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 5 (1959), p. 18.
[18] *Elektricheskie stantsii*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[19] *Radio Moscow*, June 11, 1959.

mic competition with Western Europe and the United States, the introduction of such stations is of considerable importance in view of the fact that construction costs are well below those of the normal closed-type power stations.[20]

The complete lack of open thermal power stations in the USSR puts the country at a great disadvantage in economic competition with the United States, where the capacity of open and semi-open thermal power stations amounted in 1958 to 23,000,000 kilowatts, or almost 20% of total thermal power station capacity. Various major open power stations have been built in the northern areas of the United States, where the climate is similar to that in the European SSR and the Donbas. American practice has thus compelled Soviet planning organizations to consider the question of building open and semi-open power stations not only in the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasus, but also in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Central Asia, and the southern and central regions of the RSFSR.

Part of the capacity due to be introduced between 1959 and 1965 will come from atomic power stations, which are to have a total capacity of 2,400,000 kilowatts by the end of Seven-Year Plan. In 1954, an experimental atomic power station, with a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts, began operating. Between September 1958 and the present, the first section of a second atomic power station, a turbine with 100,000-kilowatt capacity, was added. The total capacity of this station, which is apparently scheduled for completion in 1960, will amount to 600,000 kilowatts. The latter is to use graphite as its moderator, as was the case in the first Soviet atomic power station built near Moscow. A third atomic power station, with a capacity of 400,000 kilowatts, is now being built in the Urals. From the standpoint of structure it is a development of the first Soviet atomic power station. The uranium–graphite reactor will have 730 channels, while the station will consist of four power blocks. Each block will have a reactor and turbogenerator with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts. Because of extremely high steam pressure, the efficiency coefficient has been fixed at 37%.

A fourth atomic power station is being built in Voronezh Oblast. Planned capacity is 420,000 kilowatts. It will consist of two reactors, each connected with three turbogenerators of 70,000 kilowatts each. The turbines will have a pressure of 441 lbs. per square inch. A fifth atomic power station, on which work has started, is in Leningrad Oblast and will have reactors similar to those at the fourth station, but with a few structural changes. Soviet experts calculate that the layout of the fifth atomic power station will be considerably simpler than those of the others, both as regards construction and operation. However, it must be remembered that the reactors of the third, fourth, and fifth atomic power stations have not yet been built. Judging by Soviet sources, they are still being tested on a small scale. After the completion of experimental work on the Volga, a power station with a capacity of 50,000 kilowatts will be built, which will be used to determine the structural efficiency of the type of reactor adopted.[21]

G. A. Vvedensky

[20] *Planovoe khozyaistvo, op. cit.*

[21] *Stroitelnaya gazeta*, January 4, 1959.

Domestic Affairs

Child Labor and the Soviet Schools

The Seven-Year Plan for the Development of the Soviet Economy envisages an increase in the number of workers and salaried employees in the USSR from 54,600,000 in 1958 to 66,500,000 by 1965. The Seven-Year Plan covers those years in which the augmentation of Soviet manpower will depend on persons born during the war years or in the period immediately after the war. Both periods had a low birth rate. Estimates indicate that the numbers born in these years may fall below the numbers that have been called for in the Plan. One is accordingly inclined to ask what other sources of manpower are available to the Soviet leaders to ensure plan fulfillment in the coming years. An analysis of many of the Soviet government's measures will indicate that one of these sources will be child labor.

Communist theoreticians argue that child labor in the new society must be regarded as a means of education, as a factor in the transformation of the family and society, and the creation of a new type of man, the man of the new Communist society. However, the facts show that the exploitation of child labor in the USSR is serving exclusively economic ends. Accordingly, Soviet statistics rarely present data on the extent of such labor. The few facts available show that the number of adolescents employed in industry in 1940, that is just before World War II, amounted to 6%, and in 1942, to 15% of the work force. In Tsarist Russia the figure was 3%, of which 2% was male and 1% female.[1] More recent data is not available. It has been estimated that in 1958 about 10% of the Soviet work force comprised adolescents. On October 2, 1940, the Soviet government adopted a law on the compulsory enrollment of adolescents in industry. On the basis of this law, the Soviet government drafted a million young persons aged 14 to 15 years to do manual work.[2] After 1 to 2 years training, these young workers, now aged 15 to 17 years, remained mobilized and were obliged to work four years running in state enterprises, in accordance with a directive of the Main Administration of Labor Reserves of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, and were guaranteed a fixed general wage rate. The government met the mass evasion of this mobilization with severe measures. On December 28, 1940, a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was published, according to which adolescents who evaded the mobilization in the schools, and then left school, or deliberately infringed the rules in order to be expelled, could be punished by imprisonment for one year in a labor colony.

Great use is still made of child labor in Soviet agriculture. All kolkhoz children on reaching the age of 16 years, according to Part 4 (7) of the Statutes of an Agricultural Artel, become full-fledged members of the kolkhoz and they are under

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[1] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, 4th ed., 1950, III, 48.

[2] *Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Collected Laws of the USSR and Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), Moscow, 1956, pp. 371–72.

the same obligations regarding fulfillment of work norms and the annual minimum number of workday units as adults. Moreover, as seen in the Soviet government decree of October 2, 1940, kolkhozniks were considered as reaching working age on becoming 14 years old. On the basis of a decree of April 1, 1944, fixed annual rates for the minimum number of workday units were established for kolkhoz children of kolkhozniks, beginning at 12 years of age. Yet apparently all these measures have not ensured the necessary influx of young persons into productive work. In 1957, the Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers adopted a resolution, which was not officially published, on measures for the enlistment of adolescents and young persons in industry and agriculture.[3] Then came the so-called "school reform" approved in December, 1958.

The reform itself was contained in Khrushchev's "Note" of September, 1958. Although the Party First Secretary attempted to veil the Soviet leaders' intentions with talk about the ideas of Communism and the need for the school reform as a means of realizing them, he defined its chief goals as follows:

> In my opinion, all pupils without exception on completion of the seventh or eighth grade ought to be enrolled in socially useful work in [manufacturing] enterprises, on the kolkhozes and so on. In the city, the countryside and workers' settlements all school graduates ought to go into production, nobody should evade it.[4]

The ensuing so-called nation-wide discussion of the "Note" clearly revealed the Soviet population's negative attitude toward this measure. The Soviet press published numerous letters written by indignant readers during the discussion of the reform. One reader commented:

> Children's education should begin not at the age of seven but at the age of eight. After eight years of study at school boys and girls will go into productive work. At this time they will be only 15 and this, in my opinion, is too young for one to begin work.[5]

One teacher wrote:

> One must seriously consider the [problem of] continuity in the first stage. In the opinion of most parents we must first of all do away with the overloading of children with studies at school and at home. . . . In our view, not eight but ten grades are needed.[6]

Expressing the Party line, *Pravda* of November 26, 1958 defined the purpose of the reform as follows:

> The reorganization of the school . . . arises from the essential needs of Soviet society. Our homeland has entered upon a new, important period in its development, the period of the all-out building of Communist society. The fulfillment of the plan for great works in the coming seven years will be a decisive condition for our victory in the peaceful competition of the socialist system with the capitalist.

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[3] *Partiinaya zhizn*, No. 18 (1957), p. 59.
[4] *Pravda*, September 21, 1958.
[5] *Ibid.*, December 5, 1958.
[6] *Ibid.*

On December 25, 1958, the Soviet government published the law which stated: "From the age of 15–16 all young persons should be enrolled in socially useful work."[7] The law, it is true, did differ somewhat from the demands voiced in Khrushchev's "Note" and from the government's original plan. However, the concessions are rather tactical in character and intended as a temporary concession to public opinion. The Soviet government realized how far it could go and is thus preserving the existing general-educational secondary schools, converting them from ten-year into eleven-year schools. The working out of the principles governing all types of secondary schools has been left to the union republic governments.

As for the application of these principles in the union republics, the RSFSR can be analyzed by way of example. At the end of the Seven-Year Plan, there should be 21,800 general-educational secondary schools in the RSFSR. Of these, 11,500 are to be evening schools for young persons who have completed eight grades at the secondary schools and then begun full-time work in industry, kolkhozes or sovkhozes.[8] Many young persons, on finishing the eight grades, are to be sent to the vocational and technical schools (PTU). These are one- to three-year schools which will train skilled workers and technicians for industry. They are to be created on the basis of the reorganization of the industrial training schools (FZO), the schools for craftsmen and railroad workers, the vocational and technical schools and the schools for the mechanization of agriculture of the Administration of Labor Reserves. By the end of the Seven-Year Plan the number of PTU's is to have grown from 1,930 to 2,900, while the number of specialists trained in them should total 4,850,000, or 40% more than were trained in the preceding seven years.[9]

The number of so-called "general-educational secondary polytechnical schools with industrial training," which are essentially modified ten-year schools, will be rather sharply curtailed and the number of students in them will amount to about one third of the present number in secondary schools. The situation in the secondary schools is not at all clear. Apparently pupils in the ninth through eleventh grades of these schools are to spend two days a week working in industry.[10] Some 2,680 hours have been set aside in these grades' programs for work at production. If one considers that the school year in rural schools is about thirty weeks in all, then up to 30 hours of work a week in industry is expected from these students to fulfill the necessary number of workday units. Excluding the first months' work of the ninth grade, fixed work quotas are stipulated and they are an important factor in promotion and an examination subject on graduation. Much of this work and training is apparently to be done during the various school vacations. Pupils in rural areas are to adapt their vacation plans to "local conditions." The decree states that pupils "may take part in the work of

[7] *Ibid.*, December 25, 1958.
[8] *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, April 16, 1959.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, March 21, 1959.

the production conferences of the basic enterprises and become members of the trade union or kolkhoz." The next step is all too obvious: pupils will become full-fledged workers. The practical significance of the school reform for the Soviet economy was defined by Khrushchev in his "Note" as follows: "With such an organization of the general-educational schools we shall annually have to assign between 2,000,000 and 3,500,000 adolescents to work." This means that during the coming four years the number of young persons, 14- to 17-year-olds, at work should grow to 8,000,000 to 14,000,000, that is, the manpower needs of the Seven-Year Plan should be met.

It must be noted that there is not only statutory child labor in the USSR. All children of school age are called upon to do voluntary manual work. Such work is, of course, "offered" freely without reinbursement. Much use is made of such voluntary labor in agriculture. Thus the Party leadership defined the practical role of the pioneers in the realization of the Seven-Year Plan:

> Young Leninists! Our Party and our people presently have no task of greater importance than the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan. Be prepared for the struggle for the cause of the Communist Party! Be prepared for great creative labor. In the cities and villages of our land thousands of detachments are competing for the honorary title "Sputnik Detachment of the Seven-Year Plan." May the contribution of the pioneers to the Seven-Year Plan grow from day to day.... In 1965, the country will harvest 160,000,000 to 180,000,000 metric tons of grain. Aid your elders in the struggle for a large harvest.[11]

This is not merely an appeal, it is a directive to Party and public organizations, to school principles and teachers, a directive which they are already fulfilling. The pupils of one of the schools of the Krasnoarmeisk Raion, Chuvash ASSR, are to work 29,500 workday units according to their program for the first year of the Seven-Year Plan.[12] Similar reports have been published in the so-called Soviet youth press. The Komsomol Central Committee and the Ministry of Agriculture have inaugurated an all-union competition for schools, pioneer detachments, and individual pupils as a means of bettering performances in production work.

Work is compulsory in the USSR, beginning at the age of 14 or 15. Even during training there are fixed quotas and piece rates:

> During training in work shops and in production, pupils not only acquire skill at work . . ., they come to develop endurance in work processes. *Thus one must learn to work at the rate at which one will subsequently* have to work.... All work, without exception has norms both for the amount of time expended, the quality of the product, the quality of the workmanship. . ., and so on.[13]

The working day of adolescents employed in industry has been fixed at six hours by a Soviet government decree of May 26, 1956. There work is paid "on a piece rate basis identical with the piece rates for adults."

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[11] *Pionerskaya pravda*, March 6, 1959.
[12] *Ibid.*, April 14, 1959.
[13] *Professionalno-tekhnicheskoe obrazovanie*, No. 7 (1957), pp. 17–18.

Little attempt is made to provide any form of labor protection for young persons in Soviet industry. A survey of working conditions and safety devices held at the end of 1958 disclosed a very disconcerting picture in many training shops and enterprises.[14] The situation is apparently really bad on the kolkhozes since there are no trade unions. There is in fact no coordination whatsoever of measures for the protection of child labor in the USSR. The situation in the Soviet Union brings to mind Lenin's remark: "The greater the exploitation of child labor is, so much worse is the position of the worker, so much more difficult his life."[15]

This statement is an interesting commentary on conditions in some fields of life in the USSR today.

V. Minyailo

Military Training of the Soviet Population

The Soviet Communist Party leaders assert that their main foreign policy aim is "the struggle for peace throughout the world." Yet in spite of this assertion various measures are being carried out in the USSR aimed at the complete militarization of the country, and the rapid preparation of the population for a forthcoming war. The activities of the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Navy, and Air Force (DOSAAF) are a good indication of this. The creation and existence of this enormous military organization in the USSR is explained by Moscow as follows:

> Modern warfare with its new types of lethal weapons will necessitate the most active participation of the entire population. This is why every Soviet citizen ought to know how to act when the enemy uses atomic, chemical, bacteriological, and other means of mass destruction. . . . Workers acquire the [necessary] knowledge . . . in the organization of DOSAAF.[1]

DOSAAF was founded in 1951 by the amalgamation of three independent organizations: The Voluntary Societies for Cooperation with the Army (DOSARM), Air Force (DOSAV), and Navy (DOSFLOT). DOSAAF now has many million members in its ranks. It is the largest mass organization in the world. The Party and government leaders are constantly stressing the need to expand the organization even further: ". . . in the interest of the consolidation of the power of the homeland we need still more DOSAAF members."[2] At the Thirteenth Komsomol Congress in April 1958, A. Shelepin, who was Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee at the time and is now Chairman of the Committee for State Security, demanded the active participation of every one of the 18 million Komsomol members in the work of DOSAAF.[3]

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[14] *Okhrana truda i sotzialnoe strakhovanie*, No. 3 (1959), p. 73.

[15] V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*, 1948, XIX, 182.

[1] *Voennye znaniya*, No. 6 (1958).

[2] *Sovetsky patriot*, February 16, 1958.

[3] *Voennye znaniya*, No. 5 (1958).

The most important tasks of DOSAAF are:

> The training of DOSAAF members and the population in all forms of anti-aircraft, antichemical, antiatomic and antibacteriological defense . . .[4]

> The Party Central Committee expects that DOSAAF organizations pay special attention to the enrollment of the broad masses of youth for the study of the fundamentals of military affairs . . .[5]

First Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal I. Konev has stated that "the cultivation of high morale and fighting qualities in future warriors should be the constant concern of each DOSAAF organization."[6]

The society's study program is not overloaded with the teaching of political subjects, such as the history of the Soviet Communist Party or dialectical materialism. It concentrates on purely military disciplines. Some of the subjects taught are: The Secret of Accurate Markmanship; Advancing in the Mountains; Pilotless Intercepters; Ballistics and Movement; Electronic Calculators on Warships; Modern Means of Attack from the Air; Ballistics in Defense; Light in Night Warfare; Night Warfare; Amphibious Landings; The Role of Electronic Calculators in Artillery; Problems of Advancing in Wooded Areas; The Technique of Aiming Anti-Aircraft Guided Missiles; and Atomic Airplanes. Society members are compelled to undergo special training in accordance with the programs: Ready for Work and Defense; Ready for the Medical Protection of the USSR; Ready for Anti-Aircraft Defense; and Ready for Antichemical Defense. Recently a new test, Antiatomic Defense, has been introduced: ". . . since 1957, the society's organizations have been engaged in the general training of the population in defense not only from atomic, but also from bacteriological and all types of chemical weapons."[7] The various sections of DOSAAF train different military specialists: pilots, navigators, aircraft mechanics, small arms technicians, parachutists, motorcyclists, tractor operators, radio specialists, glider pilots, chemists, decontaminationists, and particular types of air, naval, and general military specialists.

Studies in the society's detachments are, for the most part, carried out without interrupting work, yet quite often society members are transferred to barracks. In 1954, for example, up to one-fourth of all active members of DOSAAF were in barracks and took part in maneuvers under conditions similar to those in wartime. Society members were, on finishing work, obliged to be present at an appointed time during the course of a month at society meeting places. They attended lessons, spent the night there, and went to work next day. Absence without leave was forbidden. Society members had to obtain a pass from the commanding authorities in order to visit one's family or to leave the post, an airdrome,

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[4] *Sovetsky patriot*, February 13, 1958.

[5] *Voennye znaniya*, No. 1 (1958).

[6] *Sovetsky patriot*, February 13, 1958.

[7] *Ibid.*, February 11, 1958.

firing range, or the like.[8] DOSAAF has its own material and technical basis, including airdromes, firing ranges, maneuver areas, training corps, military and technical equipment, naval training stations, airplane parks, motor pools, repair shops, and military and sports equipment.[9] An experimental base is being created for the designing and construction of airplanes.[10] The material and technical basis of DOSAAF is constantly being expanded. Information, such as the following, occasionally appears in the Soviet press:

> In 1957, four times more . . . equipment was prepared and delivered to the primary organizations than in 1954. . . . The number of airplanes increased four times, gliders and parachutes five times.[11]

Soviet sources do not publish information on the number of specialists trained by DOSAAF. However, indirect data provide rather impressive figures. For example, according to the magazine *Krylya rodiny*, in Irkutsk Oblast alone 1,430 parachutists were trained in 1957.[12] In the same year 14,564 parachutists took part in competitions. *Sovetsky patriot* wrote that the number of persons studying to be radio technicians has increased tenfold and that during the last four years the society had trained hundreds of thousands of radio specialists. The newspaper further noted that

> the training of glider pilots in the DOSAAF organizations has increased more than five times; pilots one and a half times; parachutists, more than twofold. The number of flying groups in local organizations has increased more than fivefold. . . . Now ten times as many glider pilots and four times as many parachutists are trained in the organizations of the society as were two years ago.[13]

The magazine *Voennye znaniya* prints that the number of drivers and other military specialists trained has increased threefold.[14]

If one remembers that according to the DOSAAF Charter "citizens who have reached fourteen years of age can be members of the society,"[15] that all Komsomol members are enrolled in DOSAAF,[16] that in the Kherson, Kharkov, Zaporozhe, and several other oblasts 40% to 50% of the adult population belongs to DOSAAF,[17] and that DOSAAF is forming sections "for work among the pioneers and schoolchildren,"[18] then one can gain some idea as to the enormous scope of the society's activities. Its purely military character is emphasized by the

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[8] *Militärpolitisches Forum*, Munich, No. 5 (1954), p. 26.
[9] *Sovetsky patriot*, February 13, 1958.
[10] *Ibid.*, February 16, 1958.
[11] *Ibid.*, February 11, 1958.
[12] *Krylya rodiny*, No. 1 (1958).
[13] *Sovetsky patriot*, February 11, 1958.
[14] *Voennye znaniya*, No. 1 (1958).
[15] *Sovetsky patriot*, February 13, 1958.
[16] *Voennye znaniya*, No. 5 (1958).
[17] *Sovetsky patriot*, February 13, 1958.
[18] *Ibid.*, February 11, 1958.

fact that its regular personnel is composed of experienced officers from the Soviet armed forces. Even official Soviet sources do not conceal this fact. In an appeal to the members of DOSAAF, Marshal I. Konev declared:

> You know that in our country there are in the reserve many generals, admirals, and officers with great experience in the building of the armed forces, the instruction and training of Soviet soldiers. Make greater use of these cadres in your work.[19]

The chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee Colonel General P. Belov declared in a report at the Fourth All-Union Congress of the Society that the "regular personnel" of DOSAAF is composed of "demobilized members of the military and reserve officers."[20] The extent to which DOSAAF is supplied with a professional military staff is shown by the fact that the chairman of not only the republic and oblast DOSAAF committees, but even of the raion committees have a secondary and higher general military education.[21]

The financing of this organization and the extension of its material and technical basis is officially the work of civil organizations:

> The Party Central Committee demands that measures be taken for the creation and extension of the material and technical basis of the DOSAAF organizations, using for this purpose the funds of the economic, soviet, and trade union organizations.[22]

Funds are also obtained from kolkhozes and other organizations not financed by the state.[23] DOSAAF's activities are often subjected to criticism in the Soviet press. The organization was, for example, reproached for not making active enough use of its liberal financing: "Year in and year out the funds allocated for capital construction are not fully used. For the current period [1954–57] the annual plans for capital construction were fulfilled only by 80% to 85%."[24] DOSAAF is criticized for not attracting enough young persons into its ranks. The activities of DOSAAF are directly controlled by the Party Central Committee and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. It is enough to point out that all the members of the Party Central Committee, Ministry of Defense, and the secretaries of the republic Party Central Committees attended the Fourth DOSAAF Congress, held in February 1958.

M. Andreev

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[19] *Ibid.*, February 13, 1958.
[20] *Ibid.*, February 11, 1958.
[21] *Voennye znaniya*, No. 1 (1958).
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Sovetsky patriot*, February 13, 1958.
[24] *Ibid.*, February 11, 1958.

International Communism

What Motivates the Aggressiveness of Communist China

In the field of foreign policy the Communist Party of China today finds itself in a difficult situation: whereas in the summer of 1958 it was able to demand categorically that Khrushchev refrain from meeting with President Eisenhower and the other free world leaders, today it clearly is not in a position to issue orders of this kind. China is presently deeply dependent on Soviet aid, and the Peiping leadership has to obtain this aid in roundabout ways, including the creation of tensions whose purpose is to hinder, if perhaps only temporarily, the chances of rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

That the acts of aggression now being directed against Laos and other countries in Southeast Asia originate in Peiping is not subject to doubt. The mere fact that at the time of the most violent fighting in Laos, Ho Chi Minh was in Peiping is sufficient proof. Moreover, in North Viet Nam the influence of Chinese Communism is on the whole stronger than that of Soviet Communism. China, in spite of enormous financial and economic difficulties, is continuing to pump considerable funds into North Viet Nam. In 1955, immediately following the signing of the peace treaty in Geneva, Peiping "donated" 800 million yuan ($120 million) for construction in North Viet Nam; three months later another 100 million yuan was "donated" and still another 300 million granted in the form of a long-term loan.[1] Further, China has presented North Viet Nam with 49 fully equipped factories and this at a time when the Chinese representatives in Moscow were complaining of the inadequacy of Soviet economic aid and especially of the slow rate of construction on plants promised to China by the Soviet Union in various treaties. The extent of this Chinese assistance not only indicates that North Viet Nam belongs to China's sphere of influence, but also testifies to the degree of importance which the government of Liu Shao-ch'i attaches to this influence. In addition to the importance of North Viet Nam itself as an addition to the constantly growing Chinese empire, control of North Viet Nam provides Communist China a route for expansion throughout the world of Southeast Asia. The "Spirit of Bandung" has given way to new methods of approach and Communist China has entered the arena of history as an aggressive force second only to that of the Soviet Union, and one which consistently disregards the principles of law, justice and self-determination of nations.

The leaders of Communist China have always feared that the heads of the Soviet Union would in some way or other find a common meeting ground with the United States to the detriment of China's interests. This fear has now been strengthened by the fact that as a result of the shift to a policy of force, made inevitable by the suppression of the uprising in Tibet, Communist China has found itself isolated not only in the broad field of world politics, but in Asia

[1] *Münchner Merkur*, Munich, August 25, 1959.

itself, where lie her immediate expansionist goals. The commercial dumping, conducted last year and greatly contributing to the development of an internal crisis, has also nourished this isolation.

The expansion in Laos, the border crossings in Sikkim and Bhutan, the seizure of Indian territory in the province of Ladakh, the prohibition of Indian pilgrimages to Tibet and the jamming of "Voice of India" programs have all had certain definite aims. They have been intended to attract general attention to China at the time of Khrushchev's and Eisenhower's recent meeting in Washington and projected meeting in Moscow and to remind both the Soviet Union and the United States that China wishes to be represented at the conference table. Moreover they are to hinder, if only partially and as regards details, any agreements or compromises which might be reached as a result of the exchange of visits. The simple expedient used last year to prevent the same kind of meeting, the opening of fire on Quemoy and Matsu can hardly be used again. There is no point in repeating such a bombardment, without being willing to run the risk of a large-scale war. Peiping will not undertake landing attempts, and in any case Moscow would hardly support her in such an undertaking at the present time.

Regardless of whether or not there actually is any danger of Soviet-American agreement, for the Chinese Communist leaders the possibility of such an agreement is a psychological reality having a direct effect on the planning and execution of their policies. It is no accident that the Chinese Communists maintained silence for twelve days concerning the agreement for Khrushchev to visit Washington. And when they finally did acknowledge it, they added as no other Communist country, including the Soviet Union, had done, that it represents "a victory of the Communist policy of peace over the American policy of aggression," a statement undoubtedly directed against the new conciliatory spirit, but failing in its purpose when disregarded by the United States.

The present internal situation of China is characterized by a complete breakdown of agriculture and industry and unbelievable chaos in transport. In spite of the good fall harvest in 1958, grain collections fell far short of the anticipations of the Party Central Committee. The "people's communes" were not interested in supplying grain to the state procurement centers and while on paper the state grain quotas were fulfilled, actually the grain was held back at the communes, where it rotted. When the urgency of the situation became clear, the government pressed army transport into service, but it was already too late and much of the grain had already spoiled.

This year a large number of natural disasters have been ravaging China. The Chinese Communist Party has been forced to admit the nonfulfillment of a series of conservation plans which had, according to repeated assertions, been long since successfully carried out. This refers specifically to the struggle against the forces of nature and official statements to the effect that the dams and other projects constructed by the Communist regime had assured the country safety by making impossible a recurrence of floods and droughts. The *New China News Agency* reported on November 11 of last year:

> The mammoth water conservancy campaign now beginning throughout the country will basically wipe out drought and water-logging and ensure a still greater harvest next year.

The newspaper *Jen Min Jih Pao* stated optimistically that "agricultural production is already basically free from general drought and flood."[2] Now these same organs have been obliged to admit that their statements were overoptimistic and have attempted to explain why, in spite of the measures undertaken, natural disasters have brought the country to the brink of famine. The Party Central Committee has reported not only that the figures were vastly exaggerated, but that the majority of the projects were carried out too rapidly and therefore had not withstood the first onslaughts of nature. *Jen Min Jih Pao* of June 22, 1959 explained one of the worst floods in Chinese history by saying that dams and reservoirs of average size "collapsed one after the other like a house of cards."

The degree to which the figures regarding accomplishments were inflated is well illustrated in the case of irrigation. On February 2, of this year *Jen Min Jih Pao* reported that more than one billion mu (one mu equals 0.154 acres) of land were already under irrigation last year but, on May 8 *Radio Peiping* provided quite another story. It said: "One billion mu can potentially be irrigated and it is time to undertake this seriously." This example also throws light on the reliability of statistics on the Chinese steel industry, which was first officially reported as having produced 11,000,000 metric tons of steel in 1958, but was later conceded to have produced only 8 million. Meanwhile the entire Chinese press was lamenting the shortage of steel and demanding an increase both in domestic output and in deliveries of steel from the Soviet Union. Moreover according to the Party press itself, more than 30% of the claimed steel production was produced in "backyard blast furnaces" and (as the Chinese Communist leadership admitted at the beginning of this year) was not fit for use. It is quite possible that the overall figure again represented as actual production what was really only potential capacity.

The assumption of a low level of Chinese industry has recently been verified by such an authoritative source as the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which, meeting in Lushan, Kiangsi Province, in the middle of August, 1959, reported that the statistics published in the Party press concerning steel production and harvests in 1958 had been false.[3] The Lushan meeting among other things officially recognized the inefficiency of backyard steel production and called for liquidation of the backyard blast furnaces in the people's communes.

As to the 1958 harvest, of which the Party press had previously said that it proved the superiority of the Chinese agricultural system over that of the United States, the Lushan conference acknowledged that last year only 250 million metric tons of grain were harvested instead of the 375 million reported at the time. For cotton the actual harvest was 2.1 million metric tons and not the 3.3 million reported by *Jen Min Jih Pao* and the *New China News Agency*.

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[2] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peiping, July 16, 1958.

[3] *Deutsche Presse Agentur*, Bonn, August 26, 1959.

It is clear that if, after the good harvest of 1958, China, especially in its cities, is suffering from a shortage of food, in 1960 there may well be a famine of even larger proportions.

The possibility of such a famine is reflected in the tone of official statements and resolutions and in the press, particularly in connection with the question of population growth. Last year a large-scale campaign against birth control was conducted in China. The campaign took place as a part of another campaign conducted under the slogan, "attack like an ocean," which demanded that deficiency in quality be made up for by quantity and asserted that on the basis of its gigantic manpower reserves China would certainly take first place in industrial construction and military might. At the same time the Chinese press printed attacks upon the Malthusian doctrine as "a reactionary, inhuman theory." The Chinese ideologists attempted to refute Malthus' assertion that the future growth of the earth's population would reach such proportions that there would be general famine because of the limits on the amount of food that could be produced and in particular to refute the view that the theory could be applied to China. The review *Hsueh-hsi* declared:

> The rate of growth of the population in our country is approximately 2% a year. The rate of increase of grain this summer is equal to over 30 times the rate of increase in population. The larger the population, even greater will be the amount of grain produced. So long as we have the need, we can produce as much grain as we want. The vaunted reactionary bourgeois theory of population has been dealt a further destructive blow by ironclad facts.[4]

This population propaganda was connected with the people's communes and the use of manpower masses for work generally done elsewhere by machines. It became clear to the Chinese Communist leaders in the middle of 1958 that the industrialization of China could not be carried out at the rate originally planned and that consequently there was only one path open—to lay stress on manpower reserves while taking advantage of the productive capacity of the Soviet Union.

The Central Committee has been obliged to assess the results of its "attack like an ocean" campaign. It has been admitted that there is real hunger in the country, but the Party press has attempted to explain the shortage of foodstuffs as due to the "increasing needs of the population." There has been talk to the effect that the system of people's communes, like everything new, is bound to entail certain difficulties before it begins to function at the height of its capacity and to produce maximum results. In this connection the Party press long maintained that the shortage of foodstuffs existed only in the cities and was quite unknown in the villages, that is, in the communes, a claim aimed at attracting city dwellers to the communes.

The official attempts to provide an explanation for the food shortage have, among other things, thrown light on the state of Chinese transport, which

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[4] *Hsueh-hsi*, Peiping, August 3, 1958.

received most of the blame for the situation. Concerning the reasons for the shortage of foodstuffs in the cities, Minister of Transport Wan Kuan-yuan reported:

> Communications and transport still lag behind the requirements of the national economy, and short-distance transport in particular is extremely inadequate.[5]

Jen Min Jih Pao, in discussing the incredible fact that there was a flow of foodstuffs from the cities to the country, reported that in Shanghai the lines of customers at the food stores included large numbers of peasants who were unable to buy what they needed in the villages.

The entire Party press unleashed a great campaign for economy in the use of foodstuffs. The Central Committee and the State Council issued a joint public appeal which prescribed for the situation as follows:

> In the rural areas the peasants' food problems during the period before the autumn crops have to be well arranged in accordance with the principle of austerity. In cities a good grasp should be maintained on the consumption of food by finding out the actual number of persons requiring food, by maintaining a system strictly and by opposing waste. No matter whether in cities or in rural areas, caution should be exercised in the consumption of food. Think of the poor years in bumper harvest time, and think of next year.[6]

At the same time rations were radically curtailed. According to last reports the residents of Shanghai are receiving two ounces of meat per person for ten days. Rice is being distributed in minimum quantities. Flour is being replaced with sweet potatoes. Baked goods must contain one-half corn flour.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Communist Party has had great success in winning the hostility of the technical intelligentsia and can no longer rely on its support. The Party is experiencing a shortage of specialists and is being obliged to resume its kowtowing to the intelligentsia, who have been promised pardon for all past offenses if only they will help the Party overcome its present difficulties. This is, of course, no indication that the Chinese ideologists are ready to form an alliance with the bourgeoisie or to recognize the superiority of the past. Charges of the bourgeois character of the technical intelligentsia remain in force. As usual, the intelligentsia is being called upon to work toward a reorientation of its own thinking, but the Party has temporarily disavowed conversion by physical force and is attempting to convince the intelligentsia that it would be to their advantage to join voluntarily with those who are "building socialism." Assistant Chairman of the "People's Front" Division of the Central Committee Chang Chi'i, speaking of the intellectuals, said recently:

> Although their capitalist political ideology is basically incompatible with the socialist revolution, their cultural and scientific learning is urgently needed by the endeavor of socialist construction. This is an additional reason why we cannot adopt the procedure of dealing with our enemy in dealing with the class contradic-

[5] *Sin Hua*, Peiping, February 19, 1959.
[6] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peiping, May 30, 1959.

tion. Some people regard the bourgeois intellectual elements as objectives of the revolution, that repression alone is for them instead of persuasion, and struggle should replace rallying. Such an idea is obviously incompatible with the policy of the Chinese Communist Party and highly erroneous.[7]

Special schools with nine-month or eleven-month courses are being created for intellectuals, where they are to study Marxism-Leninism and engage in manual labor in order to "merge" with the masses. This new attempt to win over the Chinese intelligentsia has been chiefly caused by the failure of the "be red and be a specialist" campaign. The party has failed to create its own technical personnel and now, in a period of complete economic breakdown and chaos, needs the cooperation of the "bourgeois" intelligentsia. In conducting the new campaign for reorientation of the intelligentsia, the Party is prepared to change its slogans for the time being. The new Party line was formulated in a speech by Chou En-lai entitled "First Become a Specialist and Then Become a Red."

The Chinese Communist Party has alienated not only the intelligentsia, but the peasant masses as well. The people's communes, on which the Party leaders placed so much hope, have proved their worth neither materially nor politically. The peasants have not become reconciled to the people's communes, which they regard as a burden to be dropped at the first opportunity. The *New China News Agency* has already reported the dissolution of several communes in the South of China, where not only the rank and file but the Party cadres responsible for the consolidation of these communes have deserted them.

What the members of the communes themselves think of this new form of society can be learned from their letters to relatives abroad. Richard L. Walker reports in the introduction to his collection of *Letters from the Communes*[8] that the letters present a grim picture of regimentation in the communes. They confirm the reports that the sexes are separated, old people suffer hardships, a policy of no-work-no-food is enforced, work assigments are made at distant places, and the workday is as much as 18–20 hours long. They also tell of the confiscation of property and the destruction of graves, family shrines and family identity. The individual, with food of insufficient quantity and poor quality is, described as being in a state of exhausted helplessness and hopelessness. In accordance with a recent policy large numbers of youth or middle-aged men and women, the letters show, have been recruited to go to Hainan Island, Hsing-ning, P'u-ning, and Mei-hsien to work in mines, build reservoirs or dams, and construct railroads. None drafted were permitted to refuse to go. Any individual found unwilling to obey a government assignment was subject to transportation to a work area for labor reform. Mobilization affected not only adults and adolescents, but children from eight years of age, who were frequently taken from their families and shipped to another province to harvest crops. It is quite understandable that the Chinese Communist Party, as a result of so treating its own population, feels itself endangered.

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[7] *China Youth*, Peiping, February 16, 1959.

[8] Richard L. Walker, *Letters from the Communes*, New York, 1959.

The Party's difficulties are compounded by the fact that not only has the program of industrialization been conducted by quite unorthodox methods, such as backyard steel production, but the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union has been ineffective as well. Louis Wiznitzer, correspondent for the Brazilian newspaper *Diario de Noticias*, following a seven-weeks' visit to China in April and May, reported that most of the plants built in Communist China by the Soviet Union were not producing and functioned only as ornaments. He visited factories in Paotow, Lanchow, Loyang, and Wyhan, and in not one of them did he see an assembly line. In a factory in Lanchow he saw a big overhead crane moving noisily back and forth without actually carrying anything. It did not take an expert, he noted, to be convinced that nothing was being produced there. In Lanchow he also visited an oil refinery built by the Soviet Union, and found that of the five or six cracking towers only one was producing: the others were deserted. In Shanghai, a chemical fertilizer plant, which he was told had been closed for 24 hours for repairs, had quite evidently been idle for some time.[9]

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Undoubtedly the Soviet Union or, more exactly, Khrushchev's group is attempting, at least for the time being, to exert as much pressure as possible on Peiping to tone down its aggressive policy. Khrushchev still believes that Communism will "bury" capitalism, but he considers it necessary that first the Seven-Year Plan be successfully carried out. It has long been clear to him that the Soviet Union's economy is not, of itself, equal to the task and that help must be had from abroad, first of all from the United States. However, such help on the part of the United States would be forthcoming only if the Communist bloc resolved to lessen world tensions. This lessening of tensions may be only an apparent one, but it must take place. Hence Khrushchev's visit to Peiping for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the so called "Chinese People's Republic" has been billed as a visit by the "envoy of peace."

Moreover, Khrushchev has cast himself in the role of a mediator between Communist China and the free world. In calling on the Chinese Communists to renounce the use of force in the settlement of the border disputes, he has emphasized still more his desire for peace. His conduct and statements of the last month have signified that anyone who refuses to help him in this endeavor is to be considered a radical Stalinist.

Herein one can divine the roots of the disagreement on tactics among Khrushchev's adherents and among the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Khrushchev holds that the time for the final conflict between Communism and capitalism will not be ripe until the expansion of industry called for in the Seven-Year Plan has been secured. Then the Communist bloc will draw up to and perhaps surpass the Western world in per capita production. It would then be possible to launch an attack of dumping and create chaos on the world market, undermining the free economies and perhaps this could be followed up with a change over to directly military operations. The radical Stalinist leadership of

[9] *U.S. News and World Report*, New York, June 15, 1959.

the Chinese Communist Party holds, on the other hand, that the time is already ripe and it is attempting to persuade Moscow to openly attack the free world.

All of this has been further complicated by the struggle for power within the Chinese Communist Party, which is still by no means settled and into which the leadership of the Soviet Party has been drawn as well. In any case, it cannot be maintained that the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic took place with any sign of a great come-back on the part of Mao Tse-tung, who was not even present at the conference in Lushan where the program for the development of the Chinese economy in the coming years was worked out. For Khrushchev an alliance with Mao Tse-tung, who is, by Communist standards, a liberal, would certainly be more amenable than an alliance with Liu Shao-ch'i, who in turn is attempting to form a bloc with the anti-Khrushchev opposition.

Nevertheless, the replacements and transfers of commanders in the Chinese Army indicate that the Krushchev-Mao bloc has not succeeded in winning a decisive victory in Chinese internal affairs. The departure of P'eng Te-huai, whom Mao had named as commander of the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea and later to the post of Minister of Defense, and the naming to that post of Lin Piao, who opposed Mao in 1952 and 53, throws light on the strength of the Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing group. Even more significant was the naming of Marshal Lo Jui-ch'ing as chief of the Chinese general staff. For many years head of the Chinese secret police, Lo is considered one of the most radical of the Stalinists, who have consistently opposed Mao Tse-tung's inclination toward a more liberal policy.

At the present time it is difficult to foretell what the practical results will be. Will Liu Shao-ch'i and his group reconcile themselves with Khrushchev's line and follow a path of peaceful world conquest or will they continue to carry on their own separate policy? The Peiping press has abandoned its warlike tone in the last few days, but as yet no practical results have been forthcoming.

The Communist rebels in Laos are still demanding the withdrawal of the UN Commission and the reconstitution of the previous Control Commission. Communist Chinese forces are still occupying Indian territory and there, as in Laos, they have not given any real indication of a desire for a peaceful settlement.

One thing is certain: both the domestic and foreign policy line of the Chinese Communists will continue in the future to be extremely confused. The Peiping Politburo is not in a position to swiftly eliminate its economic difficulties, just as it is not in a position to establish order in its own midst and place the reins of leadership firmly in the hands of one man or even one group. Further one must also reckon with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which any group formed in opposition to Khrushchev could depend upon the support of the Chinese Stalinists, who consider Khrushchev too much a liberal and an inconsistant "revisionist."

To sum up, the acts of aggression of the Chinese Communists in Southeast Asia are intended not only to reduce the chances for agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, but to cover up their own internal difficulties as well. However, they have in fact accomplished the opposite. By calling attention to their policy of aggression, they have also called attention to these difficulties. The failure to foresee this result can be readily explained: to judge from the tone of the communiqué emanating from Lushan, the Chinese leaders are in a state of panic.

In view of the Chinese difficulties, the Soviet Union is at present in a position to disregard the interests of the Chinese Communists in talks with the United States. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that Khrushchev is really prepared to adopt a policy of peaceful coexistence, and that is not what the Chinese Communists fear. What they most fear is being left out of the main stream of world politics. And that this will happen is quite possible, for after the suppression of the uprising in Tibet, Communist China has been completely isolated, not only in the West but in Southeast Asia as well, that is, where her direct interests are centered.

K. Alexandrov

REVIEWS

Kommunist

Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Published by PRAVDA. No. 11, 1959

The first article of this issue, "Communism–The Creation of the Masses," is devoted to a question which has been frequently discussed in the Soviet press: the proper Communist attitude toward labor. This particular piece of inspirational propaganda takes as a model for emulation the worker Valentina Gaganova, who has been awarded the title "Heroine of Socialist Labor," the highest order in the Soviet Union. Valentina Gaganova's great accomplishment consisted solely of the fact that she "voluntarily" applied for transfer to a department that was behind in its work. As a result of this single deed she has become a well-known personality in the Soviet Union with the entire Soviet press singing her praises. No large affair is complete without mention of her. Khrushchev himself before his departure for the United States commented:

> Recently there has been much mention in the press of the patriotic example of Valentina Gaganova, who transferred to a lagging brigade in order to bring it up to the most advanced level. What influenced her, what were the motivating forces behind her praiseworthy act? From the standpoint of old-fashioned self-seeking psychology it is incomprehensible: here is a young worker, who has gone to a more difficult section of industry, knowing that she should at first receive less pay for her work.

The editors of *Kommunist* handled the subject in much the same way. The girl's action was treated as the result of Communist training although, in fact, acts of this kind were common in the last century, when the *narodnik* movement inspired many students, with no fanfare at all, voluntarily to give up brilliant prospects and depart for remote regions to work as physicians, teachers or agronomists in some godforsaken spot. The story of Valentina Gaganova has been unbelievably exaggerated as a means of raising production quotas or, to put it more bluntly, of intensifying the exploitation of the workers, as the same kind of thing was done in Stalin's time through the use of Stakhanov, Busygin, Demchenko and others.

A. Davletkeldiev's article on "The Development of the Doctrine of the Socialist State by the Twenty-first Party Congress" sets out to prove that the socialist state is a state of a special type and that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the final and highest form of democracy. The main theme, as has frequently been the case of late, is the withering away of the state. There being no indication that this process is taking place at this time, the article holds that

> classical Marxism viewed the withering away of the state not as an instantaneous act, but as a prolonged process, which in the first stage is linked with the liquidation of the exploiting classes [and] with the strengthening of the socialist state.

On this assumption, the article asserts the necessity of preserving and strengthening the army as well as the organs of state security. It represents another attempt to explain the gaping contradictions between Marxist theory and Communist practice, which are constantly growing further apart on this point.

Following a long train of casuistic maneuvers, the author states:

> Also during the embrionic period of the building of Communism, the Soviet state is, as before, obliged to fulfill the *function of defending the country*. The withering away of the state is a prolonged process. This process will proceed with consideration of the international factor, with consideration of the fact that Communism will be built under the imminent threat of military attack from without. Hence the Soviet state, until this threat disappears, is obliged to fulfill the function of defending the country, to strengthen and perfect our Armed Forces, [and] organs of state security, the spearhead of which is directed against the agents of imperialism.

And this is followed by the assertion that the Soviet Union is the most peaceful of nations, constantly following a policy of peace.

Next in order of appearance is an article by V. Zakharchenko entitled "On Ways of Creating the Technology of Communism." The allotment of so important a place in the Party central organ to a man of letters, addressing himself to a subject other than his specialty, can only be explained by the fact that it is an effort to obey Khrushchev's directive to creative workers that they take an active part in the solution of economic questions. This Zakharchenko has done: he has written on complex mechanization and automation, on power and chemistry.

The article, "Problems in the Training of Working Class Personnel," by A. Bardad and S. Sokolov, deals with problems directly related to the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan, and in particular to the problem of training skilled workers. Priority is given to the demand that the younger generation engage in manual labor.

> Bringing the general educational school closer to life, improving the training . . . of the work force in the process of production, the expansion of vocational and technical training and raising of its level, will permit not only a more rational use of labor reserves, but a significant acceleration of improvement in the cultural and technical level of the working class.

E. Zhukov in an article, "History and the Present," touches upon a still unsolved problem. The study of history has been a source of difficulty in the Soviet Union throughout the past forty years and not one of the present historical textbooks is recognized as satisfactory. It is, nevertheless, impossible to do without history. The article approaches the question from a peculiar angle. It begins with a discussion of the history of Communism, including Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and declares that Marxist works must form the basis of Communist education. Only then does it turn to history itself:

> History is a political science. Not in the vulgar sense that it assumes that historical truth must be distorted to serve the political situation. History is not "politics turned back into the past." Soviet historical research has successfully overcome the subjective formulas of the M. N. Pokrovsky school which at the time caused not a little damage.

From the further statements of the author it is apparent that at present there are not any reliable history textbooks and that there are none on the horizon; in the meantime only a history of the Soviet Communist Party has appeared and a multi-volume history of the "Great Patriotic War," undertaken at the request of the Party Central Committee, is in process of preparation. According to the author the comprehensive work of the kind needed can be produced only by a group of scholars, not by a single person, as in the case of the books on historical subjects regularly turned out in England by Winston Churchill. In conclusion attention is called to the fact that in the course of the Seven-Year Plan the historical department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR will publish a five-volume history of Soviet society.

V. Vladimirov's article, "Unity and Solidarity—The Basis of Great Accomplishments," is devoted to the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the Polish People's Republic. It particularly emphasises the economic achievements of that country.

It is followed by L. Mendelson's, "Economic Crises in Contemporary Capitalism," which attempts to prove that crises are inevitable in capitalistic society and that their repetition is a law of economics. As usual the analysis examines in particular the economy of the United States, which is characterized as "the country of the most highly developed state-monopoly capitalism and furthest advanced militarization of the economy." In closing, the article maintains that the instability of the capitalist economy is due to the catalytic action of socialism in the world system and that "the entry of a new stage, of economic competition between the two systems, has made the problem of crises particularly acute."

This issue's editorial deals with the complicated problem suggested in its title, "Should Social Consciousness Lag behind Social Reality in a Socialist Society?" The question had been raised by a letter to the editors which inquired as to how one was to reconcile the contradictory interpretations of this problem given in *Kommunist*: in one case the statement is made that the people's consciousness should not lag behind social reality (ergo, it does lag), and in another the idea is propounded that in a socialist society there is a general line which is effective. In answer the editors have provided a complex analytical discussion, pointing out that there are a great many factors which cause the social consciousness to lag behind social reality. In the first place, consciousness, by its very nature, is only a reflection of reality; secondly, social ideas, views and principles are rooted in consciousness, assume traditional forms and become as it were fossilized; the third factor is the vitality of reactionary ideas and, finally, the vitality of these ideas in a class society stems from monotypism. Despite these factors, the lag will eventually disappear in socialist society. The church is cited as an example of such a lag.

In the section, "International Review," there is another editoral entitled, "The Development of International Relations and the Struggle for Peace," devoted to Khrushchev's then imminent visit to the United States. The basic idea of the article is that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is a policy of peace and

that a "policy of force" is absolutely alien to the Socialist system. The editorial closes with four points: 1) the predominance of the forces of peace over those of war is growing; 2) the active foreign policy of the USSR is a powerful factor for peace; 3) socialism promotes peace and friendship among nations by strengthening general security; 4) a clear crisis in the imperialistic "policy of force" has occurred. Khrushchev's trip to the United States is viewed as an event of world importance, testifying to the success of the peace-loving forces.

Of the remaining articles in this issue F. Nishanov's "Themis with False Scales" might be singled out. It is one of a great number of comments in the Soviet press on the trial of Manolis Glezos, who has been raised to the level of a Greek national hero. The author compares the Athenian trial to the Dreyfus affair, the Leipzig trial and the prosecution of the leaders of the Communist Party of the United States in 1949. The Communist indignation is expressed as follows:

> The Athenian counterfeiters sowing the wind have reaped a terrible whirlwind, a whirlwind of indignation [on the part] of world democratic society against the existing bourgeois systems and mores, against fascist arbitrariness, [and against] the unceremonial trampling of truth and individual freedom. The Athenian trial has become a trial of the Greek variety of bourgeois "democracy."

A. Gaev

Law in Eastern Europe

Edited by Z. SZIRMAI

A Series of Publications issued by *The Documentation Office for East European Law*, No. 3, University of Leyden, 1959, 160 pp.

In 1924, the basic principles of criminal legislation and the principles governing court proceedings in the USSR and the union republics were enacted. In 1926, a criminal code and a code for criminal court proceedings for the RSFSR, the most important union republic, which served as the models for the other union republics, were published. The development of political, social, and economic life in the USSR in the ensuing three decades could not fail to be reflected in federal criminal and civil legislation and led accordingly to the problem as to whether the criminal codes ought to be revised. In 1958, the basic principles of criminal legislation of the USSR and the union republics, a law concerning criminal responsibility for crimes against the state, a law concerning criminal responsibility for military crimes, and the basic principles of criminal procedure of the USSR and the union republics were enacted.

Issue No. 3 in the series *Law in Eastern Europe*, which has appeared with the title *The Federal Criminal Law of the Soviet Union*, provides the reader with the complete Russian text of the above-mentioned laws along with an English translation and an introduction by J. M. Van Bemmelen, Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Leyden. Dr. Van Bemmelen has compared the basic principles of Soviet criminal legislation and court proceedings with the 1926 codes of the RSFSR and also with Western criminal legislation. His analysis shows the development of the Soviet approach to the problem of crime and the extent to which Soviet views

have moved away from the "revolutionary theory" of 1924 and moved closer to the classical principles of criminal law, at least externally. The objective and scholarly analysis presented here is extremely important, if only because one must be very cautious in regarding amendments by the Soviets as a possible change in ideology in the sense that it has drawn nearer to the ideology of the West. Of most interest in this respect is the mention (in Part 4 of the introduction) of the extension of Soviet criminal legislation in the Basic Principles of 1958. Now the law is no longer limited to the protection of the socialist state of workers and peasants and the Soviet system as it was in 1926, but includes the protection of persons and rights of citizens.

Another innovation metioned in Part 4 is the abolition of the concept of "measures of social defense," applied in connection with "socially dangerous acts" and the recognition of the classical legal concept of crime and punishment. A third important feature (in Part 5 of the introduction) is the return to the principle of *nulla poena*, which is found in sections 3 and 6 of the 1958 Basic Principles. These state (1) that a crime is a socially dangerous act forbidden by law, and (2) that a law which makes an action punishable or increases the penalty does not have a retroactive force.

Professor Van Bemmelen analyses each section of the Basic Principles, thus giving the reader a description of the steps in the actual "modernization" of Soviet views on criminal law. He also notes cases of divergence between Soviet criminal law and legal practices in the West. In parts 11 and 33 of the introduction he refers to the establishment of the criminal responsibility of Soviet citizens who have committed crimes abroad in accordance with the criminal laws of the union republic where legal proceedings have been started against them (Section 5 of the Basic Principles), as well as to punishment for flight abroad and refusal to return to the USSR (Section 1 of the Law Regarding Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Against the State). Discussing the death penalty, the writer expresses the view in Part 13 that the formulation of Section 22 of the Basic Principles does not rule out the possibility of the union legislation extending the list of crimes for which this punishment would apply in the USSR. Without objecting to the correctness of this view, the reviewer feels that in the conditions of the Soviet dictatorship any article of the criminal code may be abolished, amended, or supplemented at any time, should such a step prove to be politically expedient and necessary. Here it is enough to refer to the numerous cases of the abolition and restoration of the death penalty in the USSR mentioned by Professor Van Bemmelen in the introduction (Part 13). Section 23 of the Basic Principles of 1958 provides that those persons sentenced to imprisonment serve their sentence in a corrective labor camp, without the earlier addendum–in a remote region of the USSR, or in prison. Part 14 of the introduction contains the interesting observation that in the earlier Soviet code forced labor in the camps was regarded as the more severe punishment, while in the new Basic Principles the more stringent form is now incarceration in a prison. The author states that in this case the new criminal law may only be confirming what has already been established in practice.

Characteristic of the Basic Principles of 1958 is Section 32, "General Principles for the Determination of Punishment," which has been preserved without any alteration. It provides that, "in determining the punishment, the court, guided by its socialist sense of justice, will consider the nature and degree of social dangerousness of the committed crime, the personality of the offender and the circumstances of the case extenuating or aggravating his responsibility." Not without justification, Professor Van Bemmelen compares this vague formulation, which is typical of the old code, with an equation containing three unknowns. In conclusion, Professor Van Bemmelen reasons that the Soviet Basic Principles of 1958 represent to a certain degree a collection of the criminal laws of the various West European countries at the beginning of this century and are not particularly progressive in character, a conclusion with which one cannot but agree.

On the law regarding the criminal responsibility for crimes against the state, Professor Van Bemmelen states in Part 42 of the introduction that the latest code, although still very severe, is on the whole much closer to West European laws than the 1926 code. In the opinion of the reviewer, this ressemblance is to a considerable degree formal in character and limited in large measure to changes in terminology. In sum, the material contained in the latest edition of this series should prove of great value in acquainting the Western world with the development of legal thought in Eastern Europe and is an important contribution to the study of criminal legislation in the Communist world.

A. Alexandrov

CHRONICLE OF EVENTS

(As reported by the Soviet Press and Radio)

September 1959

1 Khrushchev's speech of August 30, 1959 at Veshenskaya in Rostov Oblast published.

Khrushchev leaves Veshenskaya for Moscow.

Karelian art and literature festival closes in Moscow.

2 Khrushchev receives Iranian Ambassador to the USSR A. Masud-Ansari.

Soviet Foreign Minister A. Gromyko receives East German Ambassador Dölling in connection with the presentation of his credentials to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Chairman of the Planning Commission of the Polish Council of Ministers S. Jedrychowski and the Polish Minister of Foreign Trade W. Trampczynski arrive in Moscow.

Cambodian Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Son Sann arrives in Moscow.

The Ambassador to the USSR of North Viet Nam Nguyen Van Kinh holds a reception on the occasion of North Viet Nam's Independence Day.

3 Khrushchev and Mikoyan visit American Exhibition in Moscow.

Khrushchev receives French industrialist M. Boussac.

Mikoyan receives Japanese Parliament member T. Kitamura.

Gromyko receives British Labor Party leaders H. Gaitskell and A. Bevan.

4 Khrushchev's speech to graduates of Soviet Military Academy published.

Official Polish delegation headed by Premier J. Cyrankiewicz arrives in Moscow.

Khrushchev receives Cyrankiewicz.

Members of the Soviet government receive British Labor Party leaders Gaitskell and Bevan.

Group of US Congressmen arrive in Moscow.

British laborite member of Parliament J. Griffiths arrives in Moscow.

Official Soviet delegation headed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers D. Ustinov leaves Moscow for Prague.

Cambodian Foreign Minister Son Sann leaves Moscow for Warsaw.

Belgian Minister of Middle Class Affairs P. van Den Buinants arrives in Moscow.

The American Exhibition in Moscow closes.

Polish industrial exhibit opens in Moscow.

East German Ambassador Dölling presents his credentials to Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet M. Rakhmatov.

5 Khrushchev's speech at a Polish Embassy reception in Moscow published.

Khrushchev's speech at the opening of the Polish industrial exhibit published.

Khrushchev visits the Czech glass exhibit in Moscow.

Sudanese Ambassador to the USSR Y. Osman arrives in Moscow.

Official Polish delegation leaves Moscow for home.

6 Khrushchev's *Foreign Affairs* article "On Peaceful Coexistence" published.

The 115th session of the executive committee of the Interparliamentary Union opens in Moscow.

7 Japanese Parliament Member Takeo Miki arrives in Moscow.

M. Rakhmatov receives the members of the executive committee of the Interparliamentary Union.

8 Construction of the Dnepropetrovsk—Krivoi Rog gas line completed.

10 TASS report published on Sino-Indian border incidents.

Names of the Soviet delegates to the UNO General Assembly published.

Foreign Trade Minister N. Patolichev receives Indian government trade and economic representatives B. K. Nehru and K. B. Lall.

11 Khrushchev receives Japanese Parliament Member Takeo Miki.

French Minister of Construction P. Sudreau arrives in Moscow.

Report published on Finno-Soviet trade talks concerning the period 1961—65.

12 Soviet Union reports the second successful launching of a rocket to outer space.

World's first atomic ice-breaker, the "Lenin," launched in Leningrad.

Indo-Soviet agreement granting India 1,500,000,000 rubles of credits signed in Moscow.

Chairman of the US Congressional Subcommittee on Space Problems V. Anfuso arrives in Moscow.

Indian Member of Parliament I. Khosah arrives in Moscow.

Khrushchev receives the Indian Ambassador to the USSR K. P. Menon.

The first secretaries of the French and East German Communist parties, M. Thorez and W. Ulbricht meet in Moscow with Khrushchev and M. Suslov.

Khrushchev receives French Minister of Construction Sudreau.

14 At 12:02 A. M. the Soviet lunar rocket hits the moon.

Delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR headed by Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Y. V. Peive leaves Moscow for Ceylon.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Kuznetsov visits UNO General Secretary D. Hammarskjold.

15 Khrushchev's answer to the letters and telegrams concerning his trip to the US published.

Official Soviet statement on situation in Laos published.

Khrushchev sets out on his visit to the US.

Correspondance between Khrushchev and Chairman V. Anfuso of US Congressional Subcommittee on Space Problems on international cooperation in space research published.

Letter of congratulations to those responsible for success of Soviet lunar rocket from Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers published.

M. Thorez leaves Moscow for home.

Khrushchev arrives in Washington.

16 Party Central Committee salutory telegram to Fifth Congress of Democratic Party of Guinea published.

17 Official Chinese delegation leaves Moscow for home.

18 Mongolian Premier Tse Den Bal arrives in Moscow.

19 Khrushchev's address of September 18 to UNO General Assembly published.

Official Soviet declaration on total disarmament published.

Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin receives Czechoslovak Ambassador to the USSR R. Dvorak.

Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev returns to Moscow from Norway.

20 Khrushchev's talks with US Congressional leaders and members of Senate Foreign Relations Committee published.

Report published on decision of Council of Ministers of the USSR concerning degree of responsibility of industries, sovkhozes and kolkhozes for training their own technicians and experts.

Decision of the Party Central Committee, Council of Ministers and Trade Union Council of the USSR "On Rapidly Completing the Changeover to a Shorter Workday and the Regulation of Workers' and Employees' Wages" published.

21 Khrushchev's answers to questions at the New York Economic Club, September 17, published.

TASS report published on "First Results of Launching a Space Rocket to the Moon."

M. Rakhmatov receives Sudanese Ambassador to the USSR Osman.

Mongolian Premier Tse Den Bal leaves Moscow for home.

22 The First Congress of the All-Union Society for Innovation and Rationalization opens in Moscow.

The Belgian Ambassador to the USSR arrives in Moscow.

23 Exchange of notes between Khrushchev and the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the World Peace Council D. Bernal on the occasion of International Peace Day, September 1.

A. Montagu of the World Peace Council arrives in Moscow.

24 First Congress of the All-Union Society for Innovation and Rationalization concludes in Moscow.

25 An account of Khrushchev's meeting with US labor leaders in San Francisco published.

Names of the members of official Soviet delegation to the celebration of Communist China's tenth anniversary in Peiping published.

26 Talks between Khrushchev and US President Eisenhower take place at Camp David, USA.

Exchange of telegrams between Voroshilov and President of the National Council of Uruguay Martin R. Echegoyen on occasion of the Uruguayan national holiday published.

Economic talks between Bulgaria and the USSR held in Moscow.

27 Khrushchev leaves the USA for home.

Prime Minister of Ceylon Dahanayake receives delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

28 Khrushchev arrives in Moscow from Washington.

Joint Soviet-American communiqué on Khrushchev's visit to the US published.

Meeting is held in Moscow in connection with Khrushchev's return from the USA.

Khrushchev's and Voroshilov's messages to Ceylon's Governor General Goonetilleke and Prime Minister Dahanayake on occasion of the death of Prime Minister Bandaranaike published.

29 US Secretary of Agriculture Benson arrives in Moscow.

Khrushchev's and Voroshilov's messages to the government of Communist China on occasion of its tenth anniversary published.

English journalist A. Montagu awarded International Lenin Peace Prize in Moscow.

Plenary session of the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge held in Moscow.

General meeting of Technological Department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR held.

30 Khrushchev's answers to TASS correspondents' questions on Berlin talks published.